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ABSTRACT
The São Paulo Forum (SPF) is a resilient ideological alliance that provides extremist public
policy recommendations to formal political parties, social movements, and insurgent groups
throughout the Western Hemisphere. Based on substantial evidence, this research project asserts
that the SPF has successfully influenced the national security and defense policies of states in the
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) region. Analysis of two significant cases in South America
shows that, after being elected to high office, SPF affiliates and their political parties/platforms
sought transformation of their countries’ national security and defense sectors to conform to SPF
positions. Given its extensive influence and stated goal, the Forum’s support for malign, extrahemispheric actors, rogue states within the LAC region, and “endogenous” violent non-state
actors portends serious obstacles for the United States’ political, strategic, and operational
objectives regarding hemispheric security and stability in the Americas. Critical examination of
official SPF declarations, public statements, and resolutions; subject-matter-expert commentary;
and available literature on the organization’s guidelines, are combined with case-study reviews
of defense-policy modifications under Chávez’s MVR/PSUV (Movimiento V República /
Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela) and under Lula’s PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores Brazil) administrations, respectively.
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INTRODUCTION

This research endeavor set out to compile evidence suggesting significant/substantial
connection/correlation between a three-decade-old hemispheric ideological alliance’s
prescriptions [independent variable] and one aspect of the policy agendas [dependent variable]
of that alliance’s member organizations’ respective administrations, once national-state control is
attained by such members. The common name given to this entity is: São Paulo Forum (SPF).
In light of the alliance’s radically anti-Western stance, and given such an entity’s scope
and reach, an examination of its impact, from a more concrete defense and security perspective,
beyond the rather abstract notions about it found in most of the available literature, is justified
and merited. The cases in which member parties have implemented -successfully or not- SPFinspired national security policy changes, particularly during their tenure in (national) executive
power, suggest that there is value in studying whether or not the alliance poses a direct threat to
the U.S.’ vision for partnership throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Thesis Statement
The United States Department of Defense should consider the SPF a threat, because the
SPF has had success in changing regional defense and security policies in ways antithetical to
U.S. objectives.

Research Design Road Map
The first stage of the following thesis paper consisted of finding (general) SPF national
security directives and/or policy guidelines. The second stage included performing separate
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analyses of two distinct country cases (Venezuela and Brazil) in which SPF member
organizations have become / became ruling parties. The third stage entailed determining,
separately, if the grand-strategic and/or national defense transformations that each respective
party has striven / strove to implement, by way of their respective administrations, resembles or
responds to the SPF’s agenda. Through critical reading of secondary sources, the fourth stage
allowed for the establishment of conclusions, following the correspondence analyses derived
from the two separate cases, and of such conclusions’ broader implications vis-a-vis the U.S.’
policy vision for the Western Hemisphere – particularly regarding USSOUTHCOM (United
States Southern Command). Further-research and policy implications, approaches, and
recommendations are finally provided at the end of the results of that fourth stage.

Research Objectives
General: To prove correspondence -or lack thereof, or contrast- between (X) SPF
prescriptions and (Y) individual members’ attempts to transform national-security policy.
Specific: To describe SPF guidelines regarding national/regional security and defense
policy/strategy. To compare such guidelines to President Hugo Rafael Chávez’s MVR/PSUV (V
Republic Movement / United Socialist Party of Venezuela) administration (1999-2012)
[attempted] changes made to the Venezuelan defense sector. To compare such guidelines to
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s PT (Workers’ Party) administration (2003-2010)
[attempted] changes made to the Brazilian defense sector. To hypothesize about the level of
control/sway that the SPF has over its members’ policy agendas upon their reaching national
power.
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Research Design Rationale and Limitations
The decision to study the São Paulo Forum derives from the author’s familiarity with the
structure and the almost decade-long monitoring of the Forum’s suspected actions and most
conspicuous protagonists. That decision is also a function of the growing availability of material,
including first- and second-hand testimony and also “hard” data, now in the open source, about
the SPF. Such surfacing of primary- and secondary-source material seems to have exponentially
increased during the second decade of the present century. Once largely ignored -or, at the very
least, overlooked- by the news media, the SPF has itself now published a sufficient corpus of
information on its thinking and intellectual foundations, which allows for such field-specific
research (i.e., defense and security affairs) to be conducted fairly well.
That being said, it is important to recognize that the general, summarizing nature of much
of the unclassified primary-source material gathered has probably implied eschewing substantial
details, or specifics, about what the Forum is up to and what it has decided upon – items that one
can speculate would be available in a classified setting. On the other hand, the chosen focus on
the São Paulo Forum has, as is likely the case with any standalone-research-product’s focus
requirements, methodologically forced the author of this thesis paper to reduce and/or
subordinate the importance of other such organisms, networks, alliances, fora… of which there is
certainly no shortage throughout the Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) region.
The decision to select Venezuela and Brazil as the case-study objects for this thesis
project, is not only connected to the author’s tacit proximity to both countries’ recent historical
developments. The decision is also based on the scientific value of both cases. The SPF was born
in Brazil, although of clearly trans-regional parents. The PT party, as perhaps the most notorious
of the Forum’s founding members, attained high office after many years of SPF activity and
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consolidation, and it did so by way of its most important leader to date: Lula, whose
administration constitutes the Brazilian case study matter. Therefore, one can reasonably expect
this case study to be primordial -seminal, almost- in a larger casuistic research program within
this line of work. Chávez’s political platform was indeed a very young SPF member when it
achieved its breakthrough electoral victory in 1998. Yet, this victory was the Forum’s first major/
national executive-level electoral triumph that we know of, and resulted in, or brought about, the
most resounding impact upon a Western Hemisphere country perhaps since the days of the Cold
War’s end. The well-known ideological alignment of the Chávez administration with the Castro
regime and the Communist Party of Cuba (the other notorious SPF founding member), given the
aforementioned particularities at play, made Chávez’s Venezuela an almost irresistible choice for
a case study, whose importance/priority seemed to parallel that of the Brazilian case.
At the same time, given the absolute importance of Brazil in the LAC region, its specific
weight, and, in its own right, the dramatic nature of the Chavista regime in Venezuela, as well as
the consequences of its years in power, there is ample documentation and commentary available
in the public domain about both cases, also in the English language. The years of the
administrations of both Chávez and Lula, respectively, have already been studied and analyzed
and commented on from diverse angles and perspectives and disciplines, despite constituting
very recent world history.
Lastly, both cases are somewhat comparable on many dimensions that are usually
geopolitical and/or historical. But perhaps the most pertinent commonality of note to our
academic interests is the proximity to the United States government that both countries’ defense
establishments had up until the end of the XX century. As USSOUTHCOM partners nations, the
Brazilian and Venezuelan militaries -and, for that matter, defense and security sectors writ large-
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enjoyed the fruits of cooperation and good relationships with the U.S. armed services and other
components of the interagency, for many years in recent memory – and even excelled as partner
forces.
While time and space prevented the author of this paper from doing so, it would have
been useful to analyze additional cases – other than Venezuela and Brazil. Particularly useful
would have been those in which SPF individual members who became president in their
countries did not institute reforms that correspond to the SPF agenda, because of the explanatory
power and heuristic value afforded to the hypothesis by the inclusion of such additional case
studies, and because of the increase in scientific validity that the quantitative and qualitative
expansion of this research project would have yielded. The problem with limiting the project to
only Chávez’s Venezuela and Lula’s Brazil, for the purpose of providing exemplary case studies
to give support to the thesis statement, is that such a decision impedes the development of a
significant cross-sectional analysis, as well as that of a significant longitudinal analysis. In other
words, it is very difficult, from running the chosen research design as it stands, to extract
superior generalizations, because the dynamic between the dependent and the independent
variables will not be based on a data set and/or sample large enough (in terms of the number of
case-study countries), nor prolonged enough (in terms of timeframes), to warrant an inductive
analysis that can yield such major abstractions.
And given the fact that a full-fledged comparative analysis between the two chosen
historical cases (Venezuela during the Chávez administration and Brazil during the Lula
administration) is not the method of study employed in this project, it is safe to say that this
thesis paper relies on an exploratory research design, in strictly methodological terms.
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Finally, a comment is needed regarding the sectorial boundaries picked out for the focus
of this study. The affairs of national security encompass, within the responsibilities and burdens
of the modern nation-state, a much-larger field than that covered or tackled by the defense sector
alone. Focusing on the defense dimension, of course, made the thesis project manageable,
proportional, and a good disciplinary fit for a thesis paper at the level required for this academic
degree. However, it difficulted and therefore limited the understanding and comprehension of the
complexity at play between the dependent and independent variables. Differentiating sectors, in
cases such as the Venezuela study, seemed tough and arbitrary in and of itself. This holds true not to mention the amount of nuances and interesting facts lost- to both case studies, in the need
to put aside the much-larger national security picture, and, worse still, the greater foreign-policy
panorama, without which many factors and forces shaping defense policy get an
unfair/insufficient amount of attention.
Nevertheless, the research design paid off intellectual dividends that have the potential to
constitute themselves as breakthroughs for the understanding of contemporary and emerging
strategic/security challenges in the Americas. It is the author’s sincere belief that without
grasping the theory and praxis of the São Paulo Forum, many phenomena and trends taking hold
-for decades now- in the LAC region will remain alien even to the most trained observer.

The Vision Behind U.S. Policy for the Americas
While U.S. policy and strategy regarding Latin America and the Caribbean entails
economic (commercial/trade, financial, etc.), political, diplomatic, and social components (Mora
and Fonseca 2016), in addition to security and defense interests, this thesis paper focuses on
USSOUTHCOM’s strategy toward LAC, as an analytic tool, because: it is a thesis paper
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completed within the field of defense and strategic studies, it is a thesis paper bound by the
limitations and requirements and criteria set forth in a graduate department which focuses almost
exclusively on defense and security affairs which affect the United States of America and its
global interests and commitments, and the United States Southern Command is the premier
organizational structure and interagency hub through which the United States Department of
Defense and other key organs/components of the United States government make its defenseand-security-sector presence felt in the LAC region.
The United States military divides its coverage of the Western Hemisphere into two areas
of responsibility (AOR), each assigned to a different unified geographic combatant command
(COCOM). The first of those AORs is covered by the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
and the second is covered by the Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The latter’s AOR
comprises most of what one could label as Latin America and the Caribbean (the LAC region),
with exceptions: Mexico, Puerto Rico, Bahamas, Turks & Caicos… In fact, it «[...] encompasses
31 countries and 16 dependencies and areas of special sovereignty.» (SOUTHCOM’s Area of
Responsibility n.d.).
Strategic thinking about USSOUTHCOM’s AOR has changed quite a bit since the days
in which this COCOM was established (Stavridis 2010). This sub-section of the thesis will
provide a brief summary of what the current vision for the LAC region is, from the perspective
of the U.S. Armed Forces. The purpose here is to provide a basis for understanding how the São
Paulo Forum’s (SPF) agenda contrasts with this vision, as we move forward into understanding
what this alliance wants.
The U.S. military in this region performs predominantly non-traditional missions (Ellis
2019). Security cooperation and assistance, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and countering
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illicit drug flows constitute the bulk of such missions at USSOUTHCOM (Faller 2020). They
strive to provide the nations of the Hemisphere with the best means and ways to fend for
themselves, in a strategic environment normally bereft of conventional, state-on-state military
threats. The United States seeks a secure, stable, and prosperous LAC by way of «minimum
deployment footprint» (S. De la Peña, personal communication, March 25, 2020).
Policy and grand strategy for the southern approaches to the U.S. have openly veered
away from creating a sphere of influence to establishing an «arc of confidence» (Schechter 2019,
p. 18). This translates into viewing the Western Hemisphere as a neighborhood, in which the
nations of the Americas can coexist and collaborate as good neighbors, instead of North America
viewing the rest of the continent as its backyard.
The emphasis, at least since the end of the 1990s, has therefore been on partnering with
the willing states of the region to: mutually build capacity and expand force capabilities,
institutionalize and professionalize partner-nation defense and security, and tackle threats to
democratic governance, economic development, and to basic liberties (Faller 2019; Tidd 2017).
Such a partnership is to be pursued without the implication of U.S. continental hegemony, tacit
in concepts of late XIX century Pan-American projects (Rangel 1977).
Of course, such an approach still contemplates the implicit leadership of the United States
Government (USG) (Farah and Babineau 2019). Indeed, the corollaries of the aforementioned
strategy appear to sprout from, at least, the following four axioms: Strategic economic, financial,
military, and/or political-ideological penetration of the region by hostile extra-hemispheric state
actors will be the exception -and not the norm- in the foreseeable future. Organized crime will be
considered a threat to LAC states’ national security and will hence be combated (SOUTHCOM
Enhanced Counter Narcotics Operations n.d.). Violent extremists will be considered antithetical
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to state sovereignty and will hence be combated (Oxford 2019). Governments in the LAC region
will consider economic development and individual prosperity to be national priorities.
These assumptions beg the question: what are the implications of an absence of such a
consensus among the governments of the Western Hemisphere? And, further: what are the
consequences of an opposing view, or even an opposing consensus, existing among a significant
portion of the political forces that can hold, have held, or hold power across the region? Let’s
take a look.

What is the São Paulo Forum?
The Foro de São Paulo (São Paulo Forum - SPF) is an alliance of political and parapolitical organizations from 27 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Foro de São Paulo
Partidos n.d.), and, less prominently, some extra-regional countries. It functions as both a sort of
think tank and as a periodic, recurrent meeting platform or gathering for the region’s far-Left
forces and movements (Mojena Milián 2018a; Redacción 2019). Researchers have summarized
the strategic logic underlying the foundation of the SPF, as follows: «[it was created] with the
goal of regaining in Latin America what had been lost in Eastern Europe» (Newman 2010, para.
8).
The São Paulo Forum is a resilient ideological alliance that provides extremist public
policy recommendations to formal political parties, social movements, and insurgent groups
throughout the Western Hemisphere (Mojena Milián 2018b). One truly promising approach
(Boccanera 2019) to understanding the Forum has defined it as a political-ideological lodge that,
on a regular basis, bears resemblance to the operation of the infamous, now-extinct P2
[Propaganda Due] lodge in Italy: in other words, a society which aims to connect -and be a
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communications/resources vessel between- public figures in government, prominent privatesector individuals/interests, and the criminal underworld.
Although the SPF managed to evade significant media exposure for many years since its
inception (Guenni 2013), the last decade has hosted the debate on whether or not this alliance
commands any real policy influence over its members. The debate is twofold: on one hand, it is
about the actual structure -if it has such a thing- of the SPF; on the other hand, it is about the
SPF’s actual power and control. Given the specific connotation that the word alliance has in
defense and security studies, the word club might do as a more precise term for encapsulating the
idea of what the SPF is.
Even though, allegedly, conversations on the matter began in January 1989, the
inauguration of the club is officially situated on July 3rd, 1990. It all took place in the city of São
Paulo, Brazil. On the fourth, the Encontro de Partidos e Organizações de Esquerda da América
Latina e Caribe (Meeting of [48] Left-wing Parties and Organizations of Latin America and the
Caribbean) came up with its manifesto or joint declaration. The message was essentially negative
and the content was kept at the level of broad policy statements: the Left shall strive to oppose
what they called «neo-Liberalism».
The event took place under the auspices of the Workers’ Party (PT) of Brazil,
headquartered in São Paulo, and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Another important
convener was the Mexican PRD (Democratic Revolution Party). The two main figures politically
sponsoring the move were Brazilian unionist leader Luis Da Silva and Cuban ruler Fidel Castro,
respectively. Three points stand out from what is known: It is said that the SPF was launched to
provide a substitute beacon to the far-Left in the LAC region, given the dissolution of the USSR.
However, the Soviet Union didn’t officially dissolve until December 1991 – three years after the
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initial talks that served as prelude to the announcement of the Forum. The confluence of the
Cuban Revolution’s Marxist-Leninist variant -Guevarism- with tendencies like Laborism and
Trotskyism, signals the beginning of an era of greater ideological and operational flexibility and
pragmatism for the revolutionary Left in the sub-continent. Armed struggle was not to be
regarded as the top approach any longer. A major willingness to play by democratic rules and to
adapt to country-specific political frameworks, in order to attain national power, became more
evident. Brazil was to become an important player in this shift. Direct connections to, and
participation of, violent extremist organizations (VOEs) like the Colombian FARC and the ELN,
the Chilean MIR, and the Peruvian Shining Path, were to be carefully concealed later on, in light
of the previous point and in an overt effort to present the SPF as a legitimate political gathering –
a re-branding of sorts was therefore accomplished. Chief among the issues thus buried, would be
the links to organized crime. It is perhaps worth recalling the critical events that took place in
Nicaragua that very year1.
As a political coalition, the SPF members list totals the largest number of presidencies in
the history of the Western Hemisphere. Not looking into the Cuban example, over the years that
list includes, at minimum, 20 major electoral successes [not in order and discounting
reelections]: Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Nicolás Maduro (Venezuela), Rafael Correa (Ecuador),
Lenín Moreno (Ecuador), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Tabaré Vázquez
(Uruguay), José Mujica (Uruguay), A.M. López Obrador (Mexico), Néstor and Cristina Kirchner
(Argentina), Alberto Fernández (Argentina), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Laurentino Cortizo
1

“El Chamorrazo” was the name given to the surprising electoral victory by social-democrat candidate Violeta de
Chamorro, during the 1990 presidential elections, against the incumbent Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega [see
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html for a brief timeline (CIA n.d.)]. Many
commentators have argued that this event inaugurated a period which, in essence, allowed the Sandinistas back
to power in 2006. On a different level, such an event guaranteed amnesty and impunity for a political force -the
FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional)- deeply involved in drugs and narcotics trafficking,
organized crime, and in subversive activity – all under the tutelage of Castro’s Cuba (Douglass 2001, Chapter 8;
Fuentes 2002).
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(Panama), Danilo Medina (Dominican Republic), Mauricio Funes (El Salvador), Salvador
Sánchez Cerén (El Salvador), Luiz Inácio da Silva (Brazil), Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), and Ollanta
Humala (Peru).

The Forum’s Roots
The origins of the SPF can be traced back, at least intellectually, to the short-lived LAC
section [OLAS - Latin American Solidarity Organization] of the OSPAAAL: the Organization
for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This alliance was convened
at the first Tricontinental Conference – an event held in Havana, in January 1966, under the
auspices of the Soviet Union. The first leader of this sub-section was Chilean Senator Salvador
Allende, who would later on become President of Chile (Douglass 2001).
OLAS had the outspoken mission of coordinating the socialist revolutionaries and the
anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America (Calvo González 2018). Its life span was rather short,
but the experience served as inspiration to the far-Left founders and organizers of the SPF
(García Ponce 2016). In the absence of an ideological and strategic center of gravity or
metropolis, the strongest elements of the sub-continental Marxist current had been preparing a
way to transition into the post-Soviet era:

During a meeting, which took place on January 8, 1989, Castro and leaders of the
Brazilian Workers’ Party decided that if Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva did not win the
Brazilian presidential elections at the end of the year, they would establish an
international organization to spearhead and coordinate the whole Latin American
left and bring the United States to its knees, which was Castro’s life purpose, as
he himself had stated many times.
The Inter American Institute 2013, p. 2
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The pan-Leftist power agenda promoted by the SPF [i.e. the unification of as many
regional Left-wing currents as possible, under one banner, towards the goal of attaining national,
transnational, and multilateral power], finds its ancestry in the meetings of the Second Congress
of the Communist International (1920). According to Rangel (1977), it was during this seminal
event that the first articulate, congruent policy declarations for socialist revolution in the Third
World were drafted. The event’s Proceedings2 issued initial guidance provisions on the
application of Marxist-Leninist maxims to the struggle for World Revolution rising from the
“periphery” (non-industrialized areas).
On the other hand, the first intellectual articulation of what became the doctrine of the
Forum had already been fully essayed, in 1922, by Argentine Socialist Party member Manuel
Ugarte, in La patria grande. Having supposedly coined the term -the great fatherland- himself,
for this context, the book lays out the groundwork for the ideal that has been publicly espoused
by so many of the SPF’s leaders who have made it to their countries’ presidency and have used
that term. Chief among them: Cristina Kirchner (Argentina), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), “Lula”
(Brazil), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela). As hinted above, the ideal
can be grasped by looking, for instance, at the main event of the 24th annual gathering of the São
Paulo Forum, entitled: «For the Unity and Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean». That
edition took place in Havana, in 2018.

The Forum’s Modus Operandi
A brief look at this aspect of the SPF must take individuals and individual connections
into account. The “club” is composed of member organizations, yes, but the key personalities of

2

An open access, complete English translation of the minutes is fully available with this online version:
https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/
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the club share a common history, which unites them through and beyond ideology and
diplomatic courtesy. For example: when the Forum was convened, it was done so at the personal
request of Fidel Castro to “Lula” (Boyd 2009). Fidel had a very personal relationship with
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, a man whose policies will be examined in this work and whose
Minister of Exterior and subsequent heir in power, Nicolás Maduro, was trained in Cuba.
Leaders like Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega and Humberto Ortega have had a working relationship
with Raul Castro that goes back many decades (Douglass 2001). Chávez had a personal
relationship with Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner… and so on.
This club has been construed by some researchers as essentially a PCC - PT - FARC
[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] triad -or «trilogy»- of power (F. Boccanera, personal
communication, April 7, 2020, para. 3). In this light, the Forum is not a political organization as
such, it is not a new Internationale. Rather, it constitutes a «power system» (Boccanera 2019,
para. 5), functioning more like a network of services and favors than a league of parties.
The SPF now openly boasts having an Executive Secretariat, domiciled in the city of São
Paulo, flaunted on social media since 20133. It has an affiliated review journal or intellectual
outlet called América Libre (Peña Esclusa 2010). Although it hasn’t been able to assemble every
single year since 1990, the Forum celebrates its annual meeting in a different city each time,
inside the countries where it counts upon a member organization. Apart from the annual
gatherings, its policy-guiding continuity is ensured by the regularity of the Work Groups, «[…]
that hold meetings almost every month in many capital cities of Latin America» (Boyd 2009, p.
2). These are also itinerant: they take place in different host cities each time.

3

A closer look at https://twitter.com/forodesaopaulo will reveal an overview of the SPF’s strategic messaging
online.
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Many other structures, groups, sub-groups, and entities, some known and some less
known, sympathize with -and are at the disposal of- the SPF. In tandem, these pieces constitute
real organizational means whereby the club behaves as a kind of conglomerate. Nevertheless,
anatomy of this web is less pertinent here than an observation regarding the end result of such a
synergy: the creation of consensus. And by this we don’t mean philosophical, theoretical, or even
political [which they might never need] – we mean policy consensus.

The Forum’s Scope and Ramifications
With a total of at least 121 members (Foro de São Paulo Partidos n.d.), i.e. officially
acknowledged affiliate organizations4, the SPF is the vastest and most diverse ideologicallyexclusive power club in the entire LAC region (Boyd 2009). As evidenced before, it has reached
or has come very close to 14-15 of the highest public offices on the land. This is no small feat, if
one analyzes it from a qualitative, more than quantitative, viewpoint. For example, the relative
importance of countries like Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Panama, or Chile, geoeconomically and/or politically speaking, is enormous for the region (Peña Esclusa 2010).
Because of its weight and power, and given the coherence and cohesiveness among its
members, and thanks to the relentless, cumulative nature of its efforts and projects over time and
space, the club has survived – overcoming major setbacks like exposure or the loss of power in
crucial countries. It is still very much alive today, after 30 years of continuous operation. The
Forum manages to exert a great deal of control over/within many multilateral bodies, continental
or regional blocs, and integration mechanisms throughout the Western Hemisphere (The Inter
American Institute 2013).
4

One important thing to remember is that the list of delegates invited to each SPF (quasi) annual meeting is not
circumscribed to the list of SPF members. More countries and more represented organizations take part in the
gatherings regularly, although non-members have a limited say in the official results of the events.
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The list of closely-aligned entities that, in many respects, have come to mirror the
ambitions of the SPF’s founders includes: UNASUR (Union of South American Nations).
CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States). ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for
the Peoples of Our America). PetroCaribe.
The list of entities over which the SPF has come to hold great sway includes:
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). CAN (Andean Community of Nations). OEA
(Organization of American States - OAS). CARICOM (Caribbean Community). SICA (Central
American Integration System).
On a final note for this section, it is essential to point out that the SPF maintains a
worldwide set of connections to and relationships with other ideologically-motivated networks,
institutions, and platforms, many of them have similar traits to the Forum. Of recent media
worthiness, one can mention the emergence of the Grupo de Puebla (Puebla Group), which
appears to be a more formal, permanent political device that brings together salient elements of
the SPF with decisive operatives from the Socialist International, like Spain’s Rodríguez
Zapatero (José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Llama a Poner a Estados Unidos En “Una Situación
Imposible” 2020).
To a certain type of observer, more noteworthy could be the working relationship that the
club maintains with the ruling parties of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): the Chinese Communist Party and the
Workers’ Party of Korea, respectively. Both were invited to the 2019 SPF gathering, that took
place in Caracas – its 25th edition. It is no accident, then, that Venezuela’s ruling party (PSUV United Socialist Party of Venezuela) keeps close ties with both forces, as the Bolivarian
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Republic holds good -some would say vital- diplomatic relations with both East Asian states
(Rodrigues 2019).
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CHAPTER 1: POLICY GUIDANCE À LA SÃO PAULO FORUM

It’s not possible to separate the thinking that comes out of the São Paulo Forum, on
regional policy issues, from the works and opinions of the LAC’s far-Left intelligentsia. Some of
these public intellectuals have even been ideologues of, and/or advisers to, governing
figureheads in the region. Given the limited access to the more-detailed documentation that
comes out of each gathering of the Forum, as well as from its quasi-permanent Working Group, a
brief look at some influential sympathetic voices was granted here. However, it was mostly from
a critical reading of official [final] SPF statements, called Declarations, that a summary
reconstruction of the club’s major “party lines” on the chosen topic was attempted.

Understanding Defense and National Security Topics in Context
The underlying assumption regarding national security and the state, is that the defense
and security sectors of the LAC nations have historically served the interests of international
capitalism and have been a conduit of imperialism (Rajland et al. 2003) – to the extent that these
two are considered separate categories. Among the intellectual circles of the SPF, the corollary
on the matter seems to be that so long as the Left and the Progressives do not manage to align the
foundation and conduct of the military to the revolutionary agenda, the defense and security
sectors of the region will remain instruments against that which the Left considers the
sovereignty of the people(s).
One of the issues diagnosed as a core tenet of that tradition which these intellectuals
deem perverse, and contrary to the revolutionary program, is the “artificial” separation of the
defense establishment from civil society. The axiom then is that such a separation, cultivated

18

through multiple generations of military professionals, results in the alienation of the armed
forces from the rest of the nation-state.
This identified common trait is problematic, in the view of these analysts, in at least three
related ways: it generates a certain degree of excessive autonomy for the defense establishment,
giving rise to all sorts of abuses within a context of unaccountability; it shields and armors the
military politically, placing it out of the easy reach of the revolutionary agenda, once the Left
takes over the government; and it cements the perpetual risk of military backlash and reactionary
activity for every opportunity in which the military “caste” feels that it is being threatened, or it
is being excessively controlled, or it is losing its role of tutelage over the state.
The phrase take over the government is used here accordingly. Daniel Ortega (2003), the
Nicaraguan leader and veteran revolutionary figure, succinctly explains why holding office is
different from holding power. For a revolutionary force, making it to the government -electorally
or not- does not mean having the power. In order to enact and execute deep societal changes, a
Left-wing program, according to Ortega, must see to it that its revolutionaries are willing, ready,
and able to not only seize all means or instruments of state power, but also to accrue all factors of
power that are active nation-wide5. In other words, having (some) power does not amount to
having the power. Or, in short, government power is not total power – and what is needed in
order to accomplish revolutionary transformations is, ultimately, the latter.6
The recipe that these analysts have encountered in order to reverse or deconstruct the
(perceived) common problem of the alienation of the defense and security apparatus, within the
region’s countries, rests upon the doctrine known as civil-military union. According to
5
6

It might be worthwhile to note that Ortega has been true to his word: his administration is essentially carrying
out today in Nicaragua what he proposed back in 2003.
«El objetivo no es meramente llegar al gobierno, sino llegar para transformar la sociedad.» – Mexico
Declaration, 1998, p. 7 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013). [This quote roughly translates to: The objective is not
merely to reach high office, but to reach it in order to transform society.]
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intellectuals close to the SPF, a newly-formed Left-wing/Progressive Government ought to strive
towards establishing policies and policy concepts that seek to blur the line between the armed
forces and the rest of national society (Rajland et al. 2003).
This could be interpreted as a reform program for “civilianizing” the military and
militarizing the civilian population, following perhaps some doctrine like that of integral
defense, but, as indicated above, it goes beyond that idea. The vision-objective stretches to the
point of realigning or re-prioritizing the very function of the defense establishment, in order to
make such a function consonant with the projects of the Revolution.

Defense and Security Policy in the LAC: an Anti-U.S. Rewrite
The fight against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the War on Drugs, and the
War on Terror, including the campaigns to combat the further spread and threat of narcoterrorism, are dismissed as subsequent excuses for the military and paramilitary expansion of
Imperialism, in the absence of the Soviet menace, which, paraphrasing the Forum, cannot be
exploited anymore by the U.S. to justify intervention(ism)7. The SPF alleges that the main
victims of the War on Drugs have been the farmers [Mexico Declaration, 1998, p. 10 (Foro de
São Paulo 1990-2013)]. As for the War on Terror, there’s a good snapshot of the Forum’s
thinking on this in the 2005 São Paulo Declaration – which reads [p. 1 (Foro de São Paulo 19902013)]: «Bush [43] utilized the rhetoric of the fight against terrorism and the proclamation of
preventive war as background for trying to criminalize the popular struggles in Latin America
and the Caribbean.»8 Such criminalization, it is claimed, extends to politics, and to the social and
7
8

By 2011, the Forum had bluntly stated that drug trafficking and organized crime are threats and tragedies caused
by the policies of «Imperialism and the Right» [Managua Declaration, p. 1 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)].
The author’s translation of: Bush utilizaba la retórica de la lucha contra el terrorismo y la proclamación de la
guerra preventiva como trasfondo para intentar criminalizar las luchas populares en América Latina y el
Caribe.
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political movements struggling for the «transformation of our peoples» [Montevideo
Declaration, 2008, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]. The Forum officially expresses
rejection towards all forms of terrorism, but also towards the use of terrorism as an “excuse” to
criminalize social protest and as scaremongering. In the countries where its members haven’t
reached high office or have been displaced from power, the SPF is particularly concerned about
“the Right” using the fight against organized crime as pretext to promote security-sector policies
which «militarize societies», leverage scaremongering among the population in order to favor
ever-more repressive actions, and «reduce the political-action space for the Left» [Mexico
Declaration, 2009, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)].
The Forum has usually portrayed both the invocation of the Organization of American
States’ ‘Democratic Charter’ and the reactivation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance as mere instruments of U.S. interventionism9. Within the context of the War on
Terror, these mechanisms serve as constraints against progressive change agendas throughout the
LAC, according to the SPF [Havana Declaration, 2001, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)].
The presence of any and all U.S. military forces in the region10 is construed as an affront
to national sovereignty and to the integral, autonomous development of the peoples and countries
of the Western Hemisphere. This includes, among other demands, a call for the restitution
(cessation) of the territory of Guantanamo to the Cuban state, and even for the departure of all
U.S. military presence from Puerto Rico. The U.S. military footprint is denounced as a constant
threat to the region’s anti-imperialist regimes; decried as a repressive «occupation» army that
9

Absolute rejection of OAS, by the Forum, has morphed into heavy criticism over the years – if one compares
early depictions of the Organization, with the current stance. This change in “declaratory policy” is most likely
due to the ability of the SPF to influence and/or conquer spaces within the OAS system, over time. However, as
with any political entity and reality, one should always be ready to distinguish between what is publicly stated
and what is actually carried out in practice.
10 The United States of America is labeled an extra-regional actor on page 5 of the 2010 Buenos Aires Declaration
(Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013).

21

contributes to sustaining the economic and social policies which the SPF opposes [Havana
Declaration, 2001, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]. It claims that such footprint affects «the
stability and peaceful coexistence of the entire Latin American and Caribbean region» [Mexico
Declaration, 2009, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]. The Forum specifically denounces the
United States’ defense and security actions and cooperation efforts regarding
counterinsurgency11. The SPF has alleged that the U.S. seeks to develop its hegemonic aspiration
by way of the preemptive-war policy, with the shorter-term goal of stalling «the processes of
unity and integration» that allow the LAC region «a better defense of its natural riches.»
[Montevideo Declaration, 2008, p. 1 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]

Military as Stigma
Use of the armed forces in national security functions, and for purposes other than
defense, is considered a remnant of the National Security Doctrine and of the militarism of the
XX-century dictatorships that arose all throughout Latin America and beyond. Early SPF
declarations12 denounce any law & order use of the armed forces in the region as: illegitimate,
curtailing democracy, and abusing the military to be guarantors of the «imposed» neoliberal
11 «La estrategia contrainsurgente de los Estados Unidos ha generado la intervención militar y la militarización
de la seguridad pública en los países de América Latina bajo el argumento de la lucha contra la real acción y
violencia de las bandas delincuenciales y del narcotráfico que han puesto en crisis humanitaria a nuestros
países y que son protegidas, política y financieramente, por las propias elites dominantes a las que sirven.» –
Reads: «The United States’ counterinsurgency strategy has generated the military intervention and the
militarization of public security in the countries of Latin America, under the argument of the fight against the
real action and violence of the criminal gangs and of the narcotics-trafficking entities, which have put our
countries under humanitarian crisis and which are protected, politically and financially, by the very dominant
elites whom they serve.» [Buenos Aires Declaration, 2010, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)] Here the
Forum doesn’t limit itself to the familiar comment about the U.S. -fomenting and/or implementing- militarism
and militarization under the guise of security and criminal justice cooperation, throughout the LAC. The SPF
admits that malign and violent non-state actors have triggered a massive regional problem, but the admission
comes with a twist from class-domination power theory: the hemisphere’s ruling classes [whom the Forum
opposes] are to blame for organized crime, since the violence and the criminal entities themselves are ultimately
beneficial to the elites’ self-serving structure.
12 See, for instance: Montevideo Declaration, 1995, p. 2 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013). [Fifth gathering of the
Foro de São Paulo, May 25-28, 1995.]
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model/system. Throughout the 1990s (that is, before they had reached any high office in the
LAC region), the Forum consistently condemned what they viewed as «militarized», «tutored»,
or «cropped» democracies in the sub-continent. The states which, according to the SPF, still
espoused those kinds of political systems were deemed authoritarian in nature.
The issues of security and narcotics trafficking13 are deemed to be in need of profound
reinterpretation and reshaping, both intellectually and in the realm of policy. The SPF has
sometimes referred to this as «the construction of an integral regional anti-drug policy» [Buenos
Aires Declaration, 2010, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]. Axiomatically, any need -real or
hypothetical- for military support in order to tackle this problem-set meets the Forum’s outright
denial. That is so, despite widely-recognized, endemic regional vulnerabilities, directly related to
those issues, such as: law-enforcement and judicial-system weaknesses or inadequacies, systemic
corruption at multiple levels, the tactical disadvantages of civilian police forces against many
violent transnational criminal organizations and their local branches, the inability of the state to
secure its monopoly of force and its legitimacy across large areas or ungoverned territories
within many countries, etc. As described further below, the professional armed forces are given
their place rather somewhere else in this agenda.

Integrating the Block – Also in Uniform
There was a plan for a phased military integration of the Latin American countries’
armed forces; it was formally presented to the IV Meeting of Defense Ministers of the Americas,
in Brasilia, Brazil, by Chávez’s then-minister of defense, Gen. Ismael Eliécer Hurtado Soucre,
13 La lucha contra el narcotráfico y sus redes requiere de nueva mirada más integral que incluya la
corresponsabilidad de los grandes países consumidores, en enfoque de salud pública, y la no criminalización
de los cultivos. [A clearer posture, as seen in the Montevideo Declaration [2008, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 19902013)]: «The fight against narcotics-trafficking and its networks requires a more integral look that includes the
co-responsibility of the big consumer countries, in a public-health perspective, and the non-criminalization of
the crops.»]
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back in October of 2000 (Dieterich 2004, Chapter 1). Years later, again in the 2005 São Paulo
Declaration [p. 5, point 22 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)], the SPF briefly hints at its member
parties’ commitment to working for the «articulation in defense matters» – this time covering the
scope of the entire LAC region. The 2008 Montevideo Declaration [p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo
1990-2013)] has a positive recognition of the existing proposal to create a South American
Defense Council (under the UNASUR integrative structure, mentioned in the previous chapter).
By 2010, the creation of this instance/entity was already being celebrated on page 5 of the
Buenos Aires Declaration (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013).
The strategic end-goal of this envisioned military integration, coupled with the total
withdrawal of any and all «foreign military bases» and forces from the LAC region, is, in the
words of the Forum, to turn the subcontinent into a «peace zone»14 [«zona de paz» – a favorite
term of the SPF-linked intellectuals and political figureheads] [Buenos Aires Declaration, 2010,
p. 5 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]. In the cited document, a certain revelation is made: the
Forum had been quietly pushing for its member-controlled governments to “renovate” (i.e.
revolutionize, transform) their respective nation-states’ strategic doctrines, in order to make these
doctrines compatible with, and supportive of, the «[…] assertion of an autochthonous
geopolitical thought» [p. 5 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)] within the context of UNASUR – a
very SPF-friendly multilateral structure. This renovation finally happened... and was formally
acknowledged in 2010.

The Agenda: a Snapshot

14 In the Caracas Declaration, 2012, this concept seems to include the idea of an LAC region «free of nuclear
armament» [p. 2 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)] – an issue which will be briefly discussed below.
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From the outset, the club has expressed its utmost repulsion towards any U.S.
government initiative aimed at achieving greater economic or security cooperation, coordination,
and/or integration with countries in the LAC sub-continent. The Forum’s founding document, the
1990 São Paulo Declaration, states the following seminal paragraph about the G.H.W. Bush
administration’s plans to consolidate its LAC policy:

And so, then, these proposals are alien to the genuine interests of social and
economic development of our region and go hand in hand with the restriction of
our national sovereignties and with the trimming and tutelage of our democratic
rights. They, in reality, aim at impeding an autonomous integration of our Latin
America directed towards satisfying its most vital needs.15
Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013, p. 2

This Patria Grande [Great Fatherland] conception is consonant with Manuel Ugarte’s
(2010) 1920s dream of a socialist integration of Hispanic America – following a Bolivarian
(Dieterich 2004), rather than Pan-American, doctrine.
Integration compatible with the interests and vision of the United State’s Western
Hemisphere policy is deemed a form of «subordinate» integration; hence, an «integration from
below» [Managua Declaration, 1992, p. 5 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)] is the only
acceptable way forward for the LAC states – an «alternative» integration. In other words,
regional integration must take place in a networked fashion, without a regional hegemon
dictating the format from above. Therefore, when the Forum talks of sovereignty and of
integration immediately afterwards, it is not being oxymoronic: its official documents are
referring to the sovereignty of the desired, future LAC regional power bloc integrated as one.
15 The current work’s author’s English translation of: «Así pues, estas propuestas son ajenas a los genuinos
intereses de desarrollo económico y social de nuestra región y van combinadas con la restricción de nuestras
soberanías nacionales y con el recorte y tutelaje de nuestros derechos democráticos. Ellas, en realidad,
apuntan a impedir una integración autónoma de nuestra América Latina dirigida a satisfacer sus más vitales
necesidades.»
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Elsewhere, the SPF also hints that such a project is a phase of the work towards forging a «new
South-South integration» [São Paulo Declaration, 2005, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)],
with the aim of achieving a «different globalization» – sometimes dubbed the “Global South”.
The Forum wants complete withdrawal of all U.S. and NATO-allied forces from any and
all territories in the LAC, including from Puerto Rico and from the Falklands – even peacekeeping and HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) missions. This translates to
the complete absence of forward presence from USSOUTHCOM components16, especially land
forces, with the virtual erasure of the U.S. deployment footprint in the region – except for
international waters and neutral air space.
The SPF wants impunity and free circulation of narco-terrorist networks and
organizations in the key territories and points deemed strategic. Even the U.S. policy of reaching
out to assist in the fight against transnational organized crime is viewed as an excuse for
intervention and interventionism, under the guise of -in the Forum’s own terms- the imperialist
doctrine of «hemispheric security» [São Paulo Declaration, 2005, p. 4 (Foro de São Paulo 19902013)]. At some point, the SPF has reiterated its commitment to the «head-on fight against the
free enterprise of narcotics» [Mexico Declaration, 1998, p. 10 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)];
however, its concrete call to action demands a «peaceful and concerted» solution to this «world
problem». The hemispheric security doctrine17 «promotes [and/or augments] militarization» [San
Salvador Declaration, 2007, p. 1 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)], rather.
In turn, the mere presence of active USSOUTHCOM components -like the IV Fleet [U.S.
Navy Forces South]- is considered, from time to time, a symptom of the progressive
16 At some moments, this even includes U.S.-government or allied civilian components: «[…] the presence of the
intelligence and police services, under varied pretexts.» [Buenos Aires Declaration, 2010, p. 5 (Foro de São
Paulo 1990-2013)]
17 The SPF claims that such a geostrategic «doctrine» provides the United States with the intellectual scaffolding
to support its «system of continental domination» [San Salvador Declaration, 2007, p.3 (Foro de São Paulo
1990-2013)].
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militarization of the region. In other words, military presence is equated with a policy of
militarization. More widely, any Western-allied [they talk about «extra-regional»] military
presence in the LAC is considered, by the Forum, a threat to the security, peace, human rights,
and democracy of the entire region.
In multiple declarations throughout its years of existence, the SPF makes a point against
border security, which is viewed as a component of the U.S. concept of hemispheric security.
The Forum argues that its position opposes the criminalization of Latin-American migration,
which is done, according to the argument, by equating it to the fight against narco-trafficking and
terrorism. In 2008, the SPF essentially declared itself to be in favor of open-borders policies
worldwide.
There has been a push for the non-military resolution of the Colombian insurgency
conflict for many years now, preferably by negotiation with external mediation, a humanitarian
agenda, and the exclusion of «the presence of extra-regional military forces.»18 [São Paulo
Declaration, 2013, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)] The political solution to the narcoterrorism activity was emphasized by the SPF long before the 2016 Peace Accords19 between the
FARC-EP and the Santos administration, that originated in Cuba. The language traditionally
employed by the SPF, in reference to violent extremist organizations in Colombia, some of
which have been involved in narco-terrorism, is revealing: the Niquinohomo Declaration [2000,
p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)], for instance, calls them «military political movements».
Accordingly, the U.S.-sponsored ‘Plan Colombia’ defense and security cooperation
program received continuous condemnation by the SPF, who labeled it an interventionist and
neo-colonialist initiative functional only to U.S. global strategy [Havana Declaration, 2001, p. 3
18 Mainly alluding to the U.S. armed forces.
19 When the so-called Havana Peace Dialogues kicked off, the Forum then went on to advocate for «the insertion
of other insurgent forces into the peace process.» [São Paulo Declaration, 2013, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 19902013)]
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(Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)]. The same applied to ‘Plan Patriota’, a U.S.-supported offensive
against the insurgents in the southern part of Colombia (Vieira 2004), during the Uribe
administration. This initiative provoked a particularly intense reaction from the Forum,
especially in 200520, when it declared that such U.S.-backed programs and actions revealed the
intention of using Colombia as a beachhead and command base to «regionalize» the «war»
against the Andean peoples, as well as to promote the undermining of the Revolution in
Venezuela and in Cuba [São Paulo Declaration, 2005, p. 3 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)].
Consequently, the SPF also condemned and denounced the Bush [43] administration’s ‘Andean
Regional Initiative’, or ARI.21 Other U.S.-sponsored defense- and national-security-related items/
projects that the Forum has publicly rejected, and voiced opposition towards, include the socalled “Plan Balboa”22 and the ‘Mérida Initiative’23. These plans and initiatives are labeled the
«tip of the spear» of not only U.S. military intervention in the region, but also of political
interference [Montevideo Declaration, 2008, p. 2 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)].
The São Paulo Forum has a special place in its analyses for Colombia, for it has
repeatedly identified the Colombian government as a political-military beachhead, or
«bridgehead» [Montevideo Declaration, 2008, p. 2 (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013)], of U.S.
20 Insidious and revealing, the cited document goes back to the issue of the War on Terror as pretext for
interventionism, imperialism, and domination of the LAC region, but it does so briefly mentioning Paraguay,
Paraguayan national security policy, and the transnational terrorist threat that has long operated from and out of
the tri-border area over there. We know today that Hezbollah and malign Iranian influence are of great concern
precisely in that very same area.
21 ARI was a fiscal year 2002 U.S.-government program aimed at funding, and assisting with, a multi-dimensional
array of measures and actions to prepare Colombia’s neighboring countries to better absorb and withstand the
negative impacts that the Colombian conflict’s escalation could predictably bring to those countries. The hope
back then was that ARI would be a well-rounded initiative, helping with: the fight against organized crime,
national and regional alternative-development efforts, and the strengthening of liberal-democratic institutions
and systems (Office of the Press Secretary - The White House 2002).
22 For a quick and succinct reference to this controversy, access GlobalSecurity.org 2017, for their article on the
topic (details in bibliography).
23 Initially signed into effect by Presidents Felipe Calderón (Mexico) and George W. Bush (USA), and later
continued by Presidents Peña Nieto and Obama, this ‘Initiative’ sought to formulate, design, plan, and
implement a comprehensive strategy to jointly deal with the causes and consequences of narcotics-traffickingrelated violence, and to elevate such a strategy to the more-permanent policy level of the bilateral security
relationship between the two bordering countries. (U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico n.d.)
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intimidation, interventionism, militarism, and imperialism toward the wider region’s
governments and peoples. Examples of this include, but are not limited to: deployments of U.S.
Naval Forces South (or U.S. Navy IV Fleet), the 2008 U.S.-supported military raids -against
FARC encampments- that took place across the southern Colombian border into Ecuadorian
territory, the presence of U.S. military advisers and training personnel in any LAC country, etc.
Particular outrage came from the SPF upon the Colombian government’s request to be
incorporated into NATO, something deemed a grave threat to peace in the LAC.
As such, the Forum has reaffirmed its support for the political solution to the region’s
armed conflicts, while simultaneously expressing the legitimacy of insurgent responses to the
governments and authorities it opposes. The immediate conclusion here is that this club will
continue showing its sympathy towards ideologically-biased impunity for like-minded armed
groups, alleging the principles of non-intervention and the self-determination of the peoples.
The SPF continuously advocates for the resolution of armed conflict through the United
Nations (UN) and other international fora, despite condemning the policies of most multilateral
organisms such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and even the Organization of
American States (OAS) or the UN itself. However, the SPF has consistently expressed its
repulsion towards unilateralism in matters of global security of peoples and nation-states.
On a brief note about the Forum’s declared WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)
stance: The support towards the free and unrestricted use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
in the context of underdeveloped nations (including Iran)24, is simultaneously voiced with the
condemnation of the existence of all nuclear arsenals worldwide – calling for their dismantling
and elimination.
24 Explicit support for the May 17, 2010, joint [Brazil, Iran, and Turkey] ‘Tehran Nuclear Declaration’ even
appears on page 4 of the Forum’s 2010 Buenos Aires Declaration (Foro de São Paulo 1990-2013).
«International norms» are said to give support for the right to nuclear-energy technology.
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Lastly, it’s fair to say that the SPF doesn’t believe in keeping the military, or any other
defense-and-security-sector state institution for that matter, strictly apolitical – while not openly
advocating for partisanship. Active members of the military who have historically shown
decisive support towards -or sympathy for- the Left-wing agenda, within the countries in which
the SPF did not have a member party in high office, are called «democratic military»25. This
implies an understanding that holds, essentially, that being politically motivated towards the Left
is equivalent to the desired institutional attitude [mandate] of the armed forces: in other words,
respect towards the democratic process and defense of the constitutional republican system.

Bottom Line
Each and every one of the São Paulo Forum’s Final Declarations considered for this
project [1990-2013] treats the issue of national security, defense, and/or the armed forces: in the
most recent documents of the analyzed period, it had dedicated permanent sections, whose
paragraphs where conclusions emanating from the themed «workshops» -functioning within each
gathering- that specialized on these topics and themselves emitted further in-depth statements.
These thematic workshops were established later on in the Forum’s history, and are like
congressional committees and subcommittees at the working level of the SPF and of its
gatherings, parallel to the plenary sessions. They highlight the importance that some policy areas
have acquired over time.
The Forum has at least four non-negotiable points in this agenda: Total and absolute
decolonization of the LAC sub-continent, in order to guarantee the absence of NATO forces and/
or infrastructure in the region, as well as the political perviousness of the newly-independent
25 So it has been expressed and presented, not just in the official SPF declarations that are produced at the end of
each one of the large, quasi-annual gatherings, but also in other documents pertaining to conferences and
debates of a more intellectual/academic nature that are closely linked with the SPF’s activity. The papers on the
topic of national defense and security presented in América Libre are one example of the latter.
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nation-states. Complete decoupling of the LAC’s defense and security sectors from any form of
commitment, cooperation, or coordination with any United States government entity. This
includes doing away with the so-called Good Neighbor Policy, the concept of hemispheric
security, and the choosing of the U.S. as the “partner of choice” in these matters. Fast demilitarization of the solutions to the narco-terrorism problem in the region, including
insurgencies and the fight against transnational criminal organizations. Intra-regional, political,
negotiated solutions are taken as the ideal. A drastic change in national strategic culture and
grand strategy must take place throughout the entire region. This shall happen in order to
accommodate for an anti-imperialistic and revolutionary set of strategic and operational
doctrines, and for a foreign policy dictated by the geostrategic imperative of social, economic,
political, and military integration of the LAC into a single regional power bloc (Dieterich 2004).
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CHAPTER 2: CHÁVEZ TRANSFORMS VENEZUELA’S MILITARY

In December 1998, Hugo Chávez won the Venezuelan presidential elections, assuming
office in February 1999. He was the country’s first military president in almost four decades. He
had campaigned without a formal political party, no real political trajectory, and on a vindictive
platform of punishment against the status quo. More significant, however, was the event that
would launch Chávez’s public career after being released from prison (for leading a failed
military coup d’etat against the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration in 1992): the 1994 visit to
Havana, where Fidel Castro received Chávez with the equivalent honors of a head of state.
From the start of his presidency, Chávez made sure that his admiration for -and will to
emulate- the Castro regime in Cuba became notorious. Even the Chávez administration’s (19992012) earlier Defense Ministers acknowledged this public reality, however “neutral” or
rationalizing their stance would be, facing the media, regarding the defense and security
implications of Chávez’s stated vision and desire (Arena 2000).
Any claim of political-ideological ambiguity from Chávez and his entourage, before 2009
[when, finally, he publicly declared himself a Marxist (Chávez: “Soy socialista, bolivariano,
cristiano y también marxista.” 2009 - Cuba Hoy)], can be dismissed upon a quick review of: his
government’s “special relationship” with Castro’s Cuba, his 1994 speech at the University of
Havana, and his upholding of Bolivarian socialism as the overarching doctrine for his project.
This doctrine represented nothing new: it merely was a re-branding and relaunching of the
classic Venezuelan Left’s own bid for a “socialism with Venezuelan characteristics” [very much
like the Chinese Communist Party’s version]. Such an interpretation of the more Jacobin portions
of Simon Bolivar’s thought and deeds stemmed from a long tradition of Left-wing ideologues
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and intellectuals, stretching all the way back to the early 1920s with the works of Manuel Ugarte
(previously mentioned as the author of The Great Fatherland) and others. It can be summed up
as a Leninist reading of Bolivar’s geopolitical and grand-strategic reflections, especially
regarding Empire and the geostrategic situation of the newly-formed Western Hemispheric
republics. More importantly, the interpretation helped the Chavista project to legitimize and
make digestible, from the beginning, a large aspect of the adoption of the Cuban military
doctrine (Dieterich 2004, Chapter 3). Little reasonable doubt was left about the totalitarian nature
of the state that Chavez’s government was constructing – least of all regarding the Venezuelan
Armed Forces.

Civil-Military Union (Plan Bolívar 2000 and Beyond)
One of Chávez’s earliest and most controversial advisers/ideologues, Argentine
sociologist Norberto Ceresole, characterized the need for implementing the doctrine of a civilmilitary union, or “alliance”, as falling within the set of imperatives dictated by the popular
mandate bestowed upon the figure of Chávez -as caudillo of the new Venezuela that he was
leading the nation into-: the mandate to achieve as much centralization of power as possible, in
order to effectively lead such a transition (Ceresole 1999).
Plan Bolivar 2000 was to be the first major policy manifestation of that doctrine.
Launched on 27 February 1999, it set very flexible management parameters for military units to
directly aid in the execution of, and logistical support for, so-called national- and socialdevelopment programs, projects, and actions: anything from food distribution, to school and
hospital construction, to delivering civilian transportation routes (Strønen 2016). This Plan fell
under the direction of then-Army Commander General Víctor Cruz Weffer, and initially
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mobilized 70,000 military personnel, along with materiel and equipment from the service
components involved (Redacción El Estímulo 2018). It constituted the first of the many ad hoc /
discretionary government initiatives for social aid and assistance, which later-on would adopt the
official name of Misiones (“missions”).
Normatively speaking, Plan Bolivar 2000 was a natural consequence of the newlyimposed Bolivarian Constitution of the Venezuelan Republic, which augmented and added new
roles and missions for the Armed Forces -writ large-, in order to foment their hands-on
involvement in state-sponsored national-development policy items. Doctrinally speaking, the
said plan, and the subsequent expansive presence of high-ranking military officers in public
administration and high-level government positions, was meant to be a two-way street: it would
bring down the social and psychological barriers erected between the civilian population and the
Venezuelan military, eventually closing the historical gaps that existed between them, and it
would provide the civilian world -especially in public policy and management- with the
discipline, professionalism, and effectiveness that characterized military life. The doctrine of a
civic-military union/alliance is perhaps best defined, in one sentence, by the regime’s own
propaganda: «the fusion between the Armed Forces and the People» (Redacción El Universo
2009, para. 5).

Revolutionizing the Armed Forces’ Legal and Judicial Frameworks
The Chávez administration imposed deeper changes on the Venezuelan military and
defense sector, and at a faster pace, after the failed attempt to remove Chávez from office
(Jácome 2011) in April, 2002, and after the Altamira Square military insurrection of late 2002.
Sweeping reforms were put in place to address two critical needs of the Chavista regime: the
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insertion of government-backed, irregular armed groups into the larger structure of the Armed
Forces and the formalization of the ongoing push to give the regular components of the military
services an unequivocal political-ideological and partisan bias – which was growing but was still
incipient.
These and other critical power-building needs of the Chávez era were partially addressed,
on a normative level, with the passing of (Jácome 2011, p. 6): the 2002 Organic Law of National
Security, the 2005 Organic Law of the National Armed Forces, the 2008 Organic Law of the
Bolivarian National Armed Force (LOFANB in Spanish), the 2008 Organic Law of the Police
Service and of the National Police Corps, the 2009 Reform of the LOFANB, the 2010 Reform of
the LOFANB, and the 2011 Reform of the LOFANB.
Notably, the July 31st, 2008, Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana
(LOFANB), was an important piece / Act of legislation which was also called for, following the
enactment of the 1999 -Bolivarian- Constitution – and coming as a natural step after the
“floodgates” had been opened by this document and by the previous two major organic laws put
in place. Within Venezuela’s legal system, organic laws regulate the existence and governance of
entire public “organs” or sectors of the nation-state, particularly those under the Executive
branch of government, but not exclusively. This regulatory piece of legislation, however,
provides only a general set of parameters and limitations, pending the approval of more detailed
norms and controls further down the road.
It is outside the scope of this work to get deeper into the profound changes brought about
by the birth of the 2008 LOFANB, but suffice it to say that it: consolidated a delicate process of
shattering the vertical sense of hierarchy within the Venezuelan Armed Forces; expanded even
more the functions of military authorities and command figures into the spheres of civilian life
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on multiple levels across the country; allowed for a larger encroachment of the military upon the
functions and tasks of non-military security services and agencies; and, last but not least, this law
dramatically expanded the direct, discretionary powers and command attributions of the
President / Commander in Chief – in obvious disregard for the traditional chain of command and
the ascendancy of rank or merit (Redacción El Universo 2009).

Military Vote and Politics in the Barracks
As has been hinted at before, one can trace the origins of the process of partisanship of
the Venezuelan Armed Forces back to the 1999 Constitution. This document not only opened the
gates and set normative incentives for the open and active role of military personnel in the
economic, political, social, and cultural worlds of civilians, through state interventionism. The
Bolivarian Constitution also changed the official name of the republic and set in motion an allencompassing revolution of the symbols of national identity, pride, and power – including those
of the defense and security sectors (Perera 2019). Therefore, by both the ruling party and, later
on, the defense and security services identifying as the sole representatives of the nature of the
new republic, the state became a de facto one-party system – of which the Armed Forces became
its “gun”, and within which all other tendencies (everything outside Bolivarian socialism) were
to become only marginal actors with virtually no chance of embodying the new system’s
ideology and with practically no representative power.
The 1999 Constitution also gave the military the right to vote. It is true that it also
expressly prohibits active-duty military personnel to engage in partisanship and activities like
campaigning (Redacción BBC Mundo 2013), however, the Chavista regime has gone to great
lengths to blur the lines demarcating such Constitutional prohibitions in practice. The conceptual
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debate here centers around the issue of the deliberative vs. non-deliberative nature of this armed
body within a modern republic. The actual policy decision towards one or the other direction,
nevertheless, responds to a political-ideological project.

New Approach Toward Guerrilla Movements
The Chávez administration implemented multiple 180-degree turns regarding the
Venezuelan Armed Forces and the country’s defense and security sector, writ large. The
engagement of insurgencies and insurgent groups is perhaps one of the most noticeable rubrics in
which radical changes took place. It would be impossible to cover in this chapter the entire
timeline and sequence of actions that link Chávez’s political and personal relationship with the
Left-wing guerrillas of the region to the new policies and practices imposed upon the Venezuelan
Armed Forces. Some of the earliest episodes of irreconcilable friction and fallout with his
military and defense advisers, and with many high-ranking military officers in positions of
authority, had to do with the new doctrine of indifference and/or direct support -even financial
support-26 vis-a-vis insurgent units on either side of the border with Colombia27 and within the
urban centers of Venezuela (Markovits 2019). The tolerated presence of groups like FARC,
ELN, Frente Francisco de Miranda, Frente Bolivariano de Liberación (FBL), Tupamaros, etc.
was notorious – and the consequential Venezuelan regime’s diplomatic breakups with the Uribe
administration, in Colombia, received wide media coverage. This radical change in doctrine was
coupled with the vocal support28 -during Chávez’s years in office- by the ruling party towards
officially removing the “terrorist” / “narco-terrorist” label from the international community’s
26 The Colombian attack on FARC positions across the border with Ecuador, in March of 2008, resulted in the
capture of FARC senior commander Luis Devia’s -AKA “Raul Reyes”- computer, which provided direct
evidence that Chávez was very much involved with the FARC leadership (Tosta 2019, sec. 3).
27 See Napoleón Bravo’s recent interviews with Rear Admiral (ret) Carlos Molina Tamayo, former Venezuelan
National Defense and Security Adviser, here: https://youtu.be/j4s6MG8W-ew
28 Expressed by Chávez publicly, as early as February, 1999 (Tosta 2019).
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reference of the Colombian insurgents and from their handling of the conflict in that country. A
push for the treatment of FARC and ELN as belligerents [formal combatants, with political
recognition] was being consummated (Tosta 2019), at the same time that Venezuela allowed
sanctuary and provided rearguard for such forces (Hernández-Mora 2013) and their illicit
activities. For all intents and purposes, an alliance had formed.
Chávez’s regime showed sympathy and admiration for extra-regional insurgent and
terrorist entities such as the basque ETA, the Irish IRA, jihadist movements like Hamas and
Hezbollah, among others. A case could be made that this attitude towards violent extremists was
part of a coherent revolutionary policy, regarding state and non-state entities which the U.S. and
its allies and partners, worldwide, consider to be rogue and dangerous.

Doing Away with All U.S. and NATO Ties
The Venezuelan armed services were once highly-capable, professional forces who
participated in multiple joint and combined exercises with regional partners, under the auspices
of USSOUTHCOM. These events were truly multinational in nature and would eventually
expand in both scope and complexity, involving other NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] states such as the Netherlands, the U.K., Canada, Spain, and France (U.S.
Southern Command 2009). Venezuela's continuous and exemplary partaking in long-running
exercise programs, such as UNITAS, signaled not just an interest in bettering its own
capabilities, improving interoperability with other forces, and absorbing knowledge and knowhow from other latitudes in order to overcome deficiencies while facing the new challenges of
XXI century military operations. This involvement also signaled a willingness to cooperate by
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way of the good-neighbor doctrine, in full acceptance of friendly extra-hemispheric partners who
hold centuries-old interests in the LAC.
The Chávez administration progressively uprooted and upended the Venezuelan Armed
Forces’ ties, agreements, coordination instances, cooperative engagements, and military-tomilitary exchanges that Venezuela held with the Western-led international security architecture.
The final cessation of all military ties between Venezuela's government and the U.S. was
officially announced by Chávez himself in April, 2005. In practice, that cut didn’t happen over
night, given the fact that there were still 13 U.S. defense attaches stationed in Venezuela, plus 90
Venezuelan officers receiving military education in the U.S., by the time Chávez made the
aforementioned announcement (Reuters 2005). Nevertheless, official defense and security
cooperation between the U.S. and Venezuela eventually ceased to exist after that year.

Creation of the Reserves and of the Militia as a Separate Branch
«In 2008, the government passed a law forming the National Bolivarian Militia, and
replacing the former civilian reserve corps» (Strønen 2016, sec. 16). This sentence refers, of
course, to the 2008 LOFANB, which was passed into law by executive order [«presidential
decree» would be the term in Venezuela]. It also refers to the changes made to the National
Reserve and the so-called Territorial Guard, both created via executive order, as well, before the
September 6, 2005, organic law that better defined their actual roles & missions and their chain
of command (Jácome 2011). In fact, both fell under the direct command authority of the
President.
The 2005 organic law had defined two separate chains of command for the military writ
large: one under the President and one under the Defense Minister. This piece of legislation,
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therefore, had already fundamentally altered the overall structure of the Venezuelan Armed
Forces (Jácome 2011), both in terms of command and in terms of the original four
constitutionally-defined service components: Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Guard.
Again, this paved the way for the new changes and modifications to come.
The nature, function, and command placement of the National Bolivarian Militia has
remained in constant flux – and so has its interaction with other armed service components and
branches. This is actually nothing strange in the contemporary Venezuelan military sphere,
especially within the overlapping functions, roles, and responsibilities pertaining to internal
security and civil-military cooperation tasks29. What matters here is to understand that the idea of
this Militia comes from a desire to incorporate armed civilians into military life [“the People in
arms”], with the hope of eventually having an irregular force structure coexisting with and,
perhaps in some circumstances, even exerting command authority over regular forces (Jácome
2011, p. 8). It is an idea not limited to the sole need of having a parallel [paramilitary] armed
component that is unequivocally loyal to the ruling party and is hence directly controlled by the
political leadership (Perera 2019). It also incipiently resembles the concept of the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which formally coexists and jointly operates with the
regular Iranian Armed Forces and has its own diversified branches within. «It would be a parallel
army comprised of militants from the ruling party and with a chain of command carefully
separated from the professional military structure.» (Otálvora 2008, para. 3)

Partnering with Russia, Iran, the PRC, Belarus...

29 For reference, see the example of the so-called Guardia del Pueblo (People’s Guard), which was placed within
the structure of the National Guard.
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Needless to say or highlight at this point, the Chávez administration cultivated friendly
and tight military relations between the Venezuelan Armed Forces and those of other LAC states
that were, or still are, under the rule of São Paulo Forum member parties. The most notorious
examples being Cuba (whose military intelligence apparatus deeply penetrated all centers of
power within the Venezuelan Armed Forces and foreign service), Nicaragua, and Bolivia.
However, most noteworthy became Venezuela’s military ties to larger U.S. adversaries on the
world stage, such as Russia, Iran, or the People’s Republic of China.
The purchase of equipment and weaponry has focused on both conventional offensive
and defensive systems, geared towards both symmetric and asymmetric conflict scenarios
(Jácome 2011); in other words: scenarios in which the fight takes place either against a peer
adversary or against a superior adversary, respectively. During the Chávez era, the largest
provider in terms of acquisitions and materiel support was the Russian Federation, becoming a
sort of “partner of choice” that was repeatedly privileged -even opening up significant lines of
credit- without much of a bidding process (Napoleón Bravo 2021). The Chávez administration
got close to both the Iranian and the Russian nuclear programs, allegedly with peaceful/socioeconomic purposes, however, original ideas about co-development and co-establishment of
assets, infrastructure, facilities, and processes, in that regard, seems to have been put on hold
during those years.
But the chavista regime’s military policy makers didn’t approach major U.S. adversaries
just to purchase and acquire hardware and ordnance. Interested partners, like the PRC, turned
into the top choice for military-to-military exchange programs, training, and education (Farah
and Babineau 2019; Schechter 2019). All in all, during the Chávez administration, the defense
spending average per year amounted to a total of U.S. $3.9 billion, according to the Red de
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Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (Redsal) (La Tercera 2013). Of course, the list of
countries with which defense business was done, during those years, is not limited to U.S.
adversaries [even some NATO allies are on that list]; nevertheless, the doctrinal, geostrategic,
and even operational concepts, that characterized the Venezuelan military before 1999, decidedly
shifted in favor of accommodating to U.S. adversarial strategies, plans, and designs (Manwaring
2007).

Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (FANB) and the Subordination to the Socialist
Project
In 2007, a new motto or watchword (in Spanish: santo y seña) was instituted throughout
the armed services: Patria, socialismo o muerte. ¡Venceremos! («Fatherland, socialism, or death.
We will win!» [sic] – which is, of course, syntactically incorrect), signaling the new
unconditional nature of the requirement of allegiance to Hugo Chávez’s project of a ‘XXI
century socialism’. However, an inexperienced observer might not notice another point of
continuity here: Patria o muerte («Fatherland or death») was the famous slogan of the Cuban
revolutionaries, led by Castro, Guevara, Cienfuegos, etc., and became somewhat of an official
motto of the revolutionary government that was formed after their triumph in 1959. Around the
same year that the FANB instituted the new political-ideological watchword, Cuban flags started
flying next to Venezuelan flags in military facilities all throughout the country.
Symbolically speaking, not much beyond the obvious has to be explained about the new
status quo brought about by these changes. The attempt to equate the feeling of national pride
with the active defense of the Marxist-Chavista project, became clear and rather blatant. In terms
of broader defense policy, however, this symbolic transfiguration meant a kind of imposed
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psychological “seal of approval” regarding a major transfer of loyalty: from a defense of the
nation and the republic, the Armed Forces were to now swear fealty to the ruling party. It meant
a practical realignment of the military traditions of Venezuela, in order to fit Mao’s maxim: «the
Party controls the gun».

Anti-Imperialistic, Asymmetric Warfare Concepts
This chapter began with a brief description of the Chávez era’s main propensity within
the defense policy arena. The “special relationship” with the Cuban government stretched well
beyond the utilitarian/transactional aspects or schemes of, say, “oil and aid in exchange for
regime security”. A closer look30 at the nature and conception of the Cuban Revolutionary
Armed Forces [Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias – FAR] reveals, inductively, that
there is a cogent policy program – a coherent vision guiding all the different radical, and
sometimes reckless-looking, changes brought about in order to revolutionize the Venezuelan
military altogether. A hypothesis exists suggesting that such a deep transmutation of the Armed
Forces was operated in order to remake this institution in the image of the Cuban FAR. One of
the ultimate goals of this remake would be to turn the FANB into a resistance warfare corps. This
idea fits Chávez’s «war of all the People» / «People in arms» slogans, reminiscent of the Chinese
Communist Party’s «People’s liberation» war. The chief characteristic of such a force is the
perfect and seamless blending, and joint interoperability, between regular and irregular units, all
of which train in guerrilla/asymmetric warfare and exist, like Mao would say, «among the People
like fish in the water».
30 See: Dieterich, 2004, Chapter 3. Dieterich rose to notoriety around those years, as the chief ideologue and
adviser behind Chávez’s touted XXI-century socialism. This author explicitly and purposely dedicates an entire
chapter of his book -on an envisioned military integration of the LAC region- to talk about how the Cuban FAR
are an example to be emulated by the other Armed Forces in the region, mainly because of their value as a
vehicle/agent for such an integration – an idea that is instilled in their doctrinal education and official strategic
thought.
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The immediate insistence of the Chávez administration, upon assuming office in 1999, of
both the urgency and importance of implementing the civil-military union/alliance, could be
better understood by applying this framework to the case in point. There are other crucial aspects
to the aforementioned remake. They pertain to a higher, grand-strategic level of analysis, and
they are better illustrated by what Dr. Max G. Manwaring (2007) calls out as the quest for a
fourth-generation-warfare [4GW] super insurgency. Such an approach would rest on a whole-ofnation, unrestricted use of the instruments of power to achieve victory through complex
asymmetric means.

The Military Occupies Large Portions of the Government (Chinese- and Soviet-Style
Praetorianism)
The Chávez era brought about a dramatic and rapid expansion of the presence and power
of Armed Forces officers, both retired and active duty, in the public sphere. Other related
“innovations”, such as the ability to bring officers back from retirement, or the large amounts of
business concessions and even regional and local civilian attributions given to military
authorities (at first, extraordinarily, but later more permanently), just go to show how the
blending of the Armed Forces with the rest of the nation-state was a deliberate policy and not
just a function of the President’s background in the Army or the age-old popular perception of
the military as the only efficient/effective state organ in Venezuela. While it is true that many of
Chávez’s co-conspirators and fellow insurgents from 1992, and from his military lodge (the
MBR-200 or Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200), formed a special clique within the
new regime’s nomenklatura, which is still somewhat true to this day, it is also correct to point
out that the hardcore civilian wing of Chavismo has always wielded immense power since 1999.
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A case could be made about the so-called militarization of the state and of society, writ large –
and countless authors have suggested this as the only possible interpretation of the facts (Jácome
2011). But, without keeping in mind that the ruling party -with the help of foreign intelligenceultimately controls the Armed Forces, and that these coexist as peers with a myriad of armed
irregular groups steeped in Marxist guerrilla ideology (Perera 2019), one can easily miss the
point and think of Chavismo as another form of neo-militarism, neo-Prussianism, or as another
re-edition of the National Security Doctrine regimes that the LAC region was familiar with in the
XX century. And the point here could very well be that the Chavista project needed, as one of its
power-building imperatives, to transform Venezuela into a one-party system as quickly as
possible, and a culturally-acceptable and feasible means to achieve that goal was to turn as many
state organs as possible into subservient limbs of the most critical asset held by the Leninist
party: its gun.

Creating the CEO (Comando Estratégico Operacional)
The 2005 Organic Law of the National Armed Forces set the stage for securing the
President’s full, direct, personal, and permanent operational control over all military components
in Venezuela, by way of the creation of the Strategic Operational Command, or CEO in Spanish.
It did away with the old CUFAN (Comando Unificado de la Fuerza Armada Nacional or Unified
Command of the National Armed Forces) and established the CEO to be on the same
hierarchical level, within the triple chain of command, as both the Defense Ministry and the
Comando General de la Reserva Nacional y de Movilización Nacional (General Command of
the National Reserves and of National Mobilization). The CEO was to become the «top organ for
programming, planning, direction, execution, and joint strategic-operational control of the
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National Armed Forces» (Belmonte Guzmán 2012, p. 144). The significance of the Chávez
government’s push for the establishment of this organ has been highlighted by both sympathizers
and detractors of the regime, chiefly because it consolidated the Presidency’s grip31 over the
operational chain of command, later expanding the CEO’s prerogatives into the areas of military
thought and ideology, doctrinal development, concepts of operations, etc.

Creating New Ranks for the High Command
On a final note regarding the most conspicuous policy changes made to the Venezuelan
defense sector, during the Chávez administration (1999-2012), the creation of new ranks for the
service components’ hierarchies must be briefly addressed. To begin with, the formal rank of
Commander in Chief was instituted for the President of the Republic, with its own symbols and
insignia – and this meant the reinstatement of Chávez himself to the condition of active-duty
military. Corps commander ranks were created for 3-sun [the U.S. equivalent would be 3-star]
officers, designated as Major General and Major Admiral – depending on which service
component they belong to. Above them, 4-sun officers will be promoted to the new ranks of
General in Chief and Admiral in Chief, depending on the service. It has been pointed out that
these new additions to the top of the hierarchy were an adapted copy of the Cuban FAR ranks
(Otálvora 2008, sec. 2), meant to accommodate the new FANB structure to the concepts and
functions of the FANB’s new reality.

Bottom Line
31 It wasn’t a standalone innovation, however. Along with the making of the CEO and through subsequent pieces
of legislation, such as the 2008 LOFANB, came other organs: «Se instituye la Comandancia en Jefe, que
personaliza en el Presidente de la República la responsabilidad del funcionamiento y empleo profesional de la
FANB.» [«The Office of the Commander in Chief is instituted, which personalizes, on the President of the
Republic, the responsibility over the functioning and professional use of the Bolivarian National Armed
Forces.»] (Belmonte Guzmán 2012, p. 199)
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In many respects, Chávez was one of the São Paulo Forum’s most obedient and diligent
soldiers. Despite not fulfilling every single point in the agenda, he was well under way towards
completing the mission by the time he died. Venezuela’s story under Chávez is an SPF success
story. Chávez also laid the foundations of more future victories for the Forum.
His foreign policy was generally hostile to Western and NATO governments and
interests, a fact that typically qualifies the Chávez regime as anti-imperialistic and anticolonialistic. This was mostly true, despite having dealt in defense-and-security-sector purchases
with Spain and Turkey, for example, who are both NATO allies. But his dealings with state
actors such as Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Belarus, etc. demonstrate what type of imperialism or
colonialism is acceptable to the Chavista revolutionary project and, by extension, to the Forum.
Severing all ties to the United States was a hallmark of the Chávez administration. It went
well beyond rhetoric and reached deeply and widely into all aspects of the defense sector.
Venezuela was basically taken out of any equation, possibility, or design to take part in the Good
Neighbor Policy, becoming perhaps the antithesis of that vision-objective aspired by the United
States in terms of what it desires the nations of the Western Hemisphere to evolve towards. Not
only were all ties severed but also was anti-Americanism to become leitmotif, raison d'être of
the Chavista revolution: an enemy without which the project could not exist.
Chávez would do a whole lot more than rock the Venezuelan military’s boat: he set
Venezuelan national security on a path of irreversible transformation. The foundational endgoals of the modern nation-state, in terms of administering justice, securing sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the national territory and population, and defending those prerogatives against
enemies foreign and domestic, were no longer priorities for the Venezuelan government.
Narcotics trafficking, to name just one prevalent example, became not simply a low priority in
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terms of what the military was going to combat: it became one of the high command’s most
infamous trades. Venezuela’s territory thus turned into one of the world’s largest transportation
hubs for illegal substances such as cocaine and heroine.
Chávez’s legacy regarding the Venezuelan national security and defense sectors should
perhaps be associated chiefly with the “irregularization” or even “paramilitarization” of the
military. Some analysts have claimed that Chávez rendered the military useless, in terms of its
classic republican role. Others have said that he turned the Venezuelan military into nothing
more than the ruling party’s praetorian guard. Yet some have argued that it is the totalitarian
model of a blend between ideologically-fanatical, personally-loyal corps on one hand, and
regular, traditionally-trained units on the other hand, what he was after – perhaps with the
ultimate objective not of completely getting rid of the latter, but of eventually subordinating the
latter to the former. Whatever the case may be, lest we forget two important historical facts.
First, that the modern-day “collectives”, who are -essentially- armed political gangs of civilians
that aid in the repression and terrorizing of the dissident population in Venezuela, are in part a
willful, improved offshoot from the early-day Bolivarian Circles, created before the first failed
attempt to remove Chávez from office, in April of 2002, and organized precisely for such a
scenario. Second, that then-Defense Minister General Raúl Baduel, who had a starring role in
bringing Chávez back to power during the events of April of 2002, a few years later did
everything he could to please Chávez’s desire of parading the work -and the person!- of SpanishFrench revolutionary intellectual Jorge Verstrynge to the Venezuelan officer corps, especially his
most famous book on asymmetric warfare. What is made evident by all of this is the Chávez
administration’s undeniable, irrefutable policy of incorporating the civil-military asymmetric
resistance warfare concepts and doctrines into all levels (tactical, operational, strategic),
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domains, and dimensions of national security. This follows the SPF’s prescriptions quite
faithfully.
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CHAPTER 3: LULA PROJECTS BRAZIL’S MILITARY OUTWARD

Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, Brazil's Workers’ Party [PT] candidate for the Presidency in
the October 2002 elections, defeated his opponent in the two electoral rounds held that year. He
had been running for President almost consecutively since 1989, when a new era of democratic
change was inaugurated in Brazil. Upon assuming office in January 1st, 2003, Lula set out to
reposition Brazil on the world stage. His administration (2003-2010) was the first to seek a
distinct level of independence for the Brazilian defense sector, from the traditional grip of the
diplomatic bureaucracy of the Brazilian foreign policy apparatus (Alves Soares 2012).
At the same time, this new-found autonomy meant a larger role for the Defense Ministry
and the Armed Forces in the shaping of Brazilian foreign affairs. In this sense, Brazil used both
diplomatic and defense instruments of state power to reassert its position regionally, vis-a-vis the
United States primarily (Duarte Villa and Viana 2010). Brazil’s military establishment
traditionally had an inward-looking mentality, focused on internal security-and-order functions
as an important subset of tasks for national development. This vision had translated into the
Brazilian Armed Forces intervening in politics and civilian affairs, multiple times throughout the
XX century, particularly during the bipolar contest of the Cold War, counterinsurgency, and
anticommunist activity (Bitencourt 2018).
Under Lula, some transcendental changes were implemented in terms of giving renewed
purpose, coherence, and grand-strategic weight to the roles & missions of the Brazilian defense
sector. However, there doesn’t appear to have been a major push, during Lula’s time in office, to
radically or essentially transform the nature and institutional function of the Brazilian Armed
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Forces as the premier state organ charged with the defense of national sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The following is a brief overview of what novelties did take place.

Brazil Signals an Opposing Regional Stance Regarding the Defense-Security Divide
In the context of the OAS, during the Special Conference on Security held in Mexico
City in October, 2003, the Brazilian delegation opposed the proposal presented by the U.S.
delegation: it suggested deeper cooperation between the Armed Forces and national police forces
in the fight against narcotics, terrorism, and illegal migration (Duarte Villa and Viana 2010).
This signaled an internal shift in policy-direction, on the part of Lula’s government team,
because Brazil was no longer willing to consider the need to militarize police functions inside its
borders and urban centers. It would also imply a deeper review of the approach towards the drug
problem – a review which would manifest itself through such items as the stance regarding the
Colombian FARC (Bula-Escobar 2016).

War on Terror in the LAC? What Terror?
The Lula administration refused to wholeheartedly adopt the U.S. policy of a fight
against international terrorism. Regarding South America, Lula’s team wouldn’t recognize the
presence of terrorist organizations. They also didn’t accept the designation of some regional
insurgencies as terrorist groups, even in the face of U.S. and Colombian pressure (Duarte Villa
and Viana 2010; Bula-Escobar 2016). In this sense, Lula’s Brazil was following its 2003
incorporation of the concept of multidimensional security, which made grate emphasis on the
analysis of the root causes of national security threats and vulnerabilities from an assessment of
socioeconomic, cultural, sociopolitical, and other factors and catalysts.
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A South American Defense Council at the Heart of UNASUR
On March 4th, 2008, President Lula made public his push for the establishment of a South
American Defense Council [Spanish: Consejo de Defensa Suramericano - CODESUR]. The
announcement came on the heels of Operation Phoenix: the attack on a FARC encampment,
across the border with Ecuador, by the Colombian military, on March 1st. The CODESUR was
officially approved and launched on December 15th, 2008 (Bitencourt 2018, p. 25). Some
analysts have linked the Brazilian move to create the CODESUR as either: a smart leveraging of
the so-called Andean diplomatic crisis of the time, that broke out between Ecuador-Venezuela
and Colombia, in order to position itself as a regional leader in crises management (Alves Soares
2012); or as a stepping stone towards a higher goal, pertaining to Brazil's appetite for a
permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council [UNSC]. After all, Lula had suggested, in his
announcement, that the proposed CODESUR ought to have a representative country at the
UNSC (Voice of America 2008). In addition to that, the CODESUR is meant to be at the very
heart of the UNASUR bloc’s integration structure [itself heavily influenced by Lula’s PT, in its
conception], breathing life into the Union by functioning as a permanent body for regional
defense-and-security consultation, cooperation, and crisis diffusion/resolution (Marirrodriga
2008). Therefore, Lula’s opportunistic move is also consistent with his administration’s quest to
reorient the focus of the Brazilian Armed Forces outward, gladly supplanting a perceived
vacuum left by the U.S. government across the LAC region.

Seeking the Technological Modernization of Brazilian Military Forces
In September 2009, Lula and Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to begin negotiations facing the
decision by Brazil to invest US$14 billion in military hardware, marking the country’s largest
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defense-spending spree in more than 50 years (Perasso 2009). Brazil’s nuclear submarine
program was included in the list of goals set forth with this agreement, and such an ambition had
been part of Brazil’s military modernization plans for years. Conventional submarines,
helicopters, next-generation fighter-bombers, and assistance with domestic defense-industrial
development [technological transfer, etc.] were some of the items negotiated in this partnership
with France. Lula had been very adamant about Brazil's potential to become a domestic-arms
production powerhouse, in its quest to become both a regional defense leader and a considerable
player on the international arena (Alves Soares 2012). Brazil thus turned into the number one
defense spender in the LAC region, investing a total of US$23 billion in 2008 alone – with an
increment of 50% for the defense-and-security budget, since Lula assumed the Presidency
(Perasso 2009, paras. 13–14).

Peacekeeping Mission to Haiti: Proving Brazil’s Burden Sharing
«Brazil provided the backbone of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH.
Its troops were present for the duration of the mission between 2004-2017.» (UN News Date
unavailable, sec. 3) With the deployment of Brazilian troops to Haiti, Lula was pursuing multiple
foreign policy short-term objectives. In terms of defense policy, his administration was proving
the Armed Forces’ capability to provide an autonomous response to regional challenges. Lula
was also therefore able to even out the perception that his government was looking to cancel U.S.
military and security objectives in the region: by contributing to the U.N. mission, the idea of
burden-sharing with regional partners, which is one of the core tenets of USSOUTHCOM’s
command strategy, was materializing, albeit in a non-coordinated way.
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The Defense Ministry Assumes a New Stature
The decision process to deploy Brazilian troops and command forces to MINUSTAH,
during Lula’s tenure, rested primarily on the Executive branch of government, particularly the
Presidency and the Defense Ministry (Duarte Villa and Viana 2010). Brazilian foreign policy
tradition dictated that the Foreign Relations Ministry [also referred to as Itamaraty] was the
ultimate guiding hand in all matters pertaining to the interaction between Brazil and the world
(Alves Soares 2012). The Lula administration forged a new degree of political control for the
Defense Ministry over the Armed Forces and, at the same time, elevated the Defense Ministry’s
stance in foreign affairs – from a supporting role to a starring one. This empowerment was
consistent with the Lula administration’s desire to establish the Brazilian defense sector as a
strategic leader in the LAC region.

Forging a Systematic Approach to Strategic Guidance
During Lula’s years in office, the national objective of strengthening Brazil's national
defense agencies and military services was streamlined, on paper, to the country’s global
strategy. A new systematic approach to better instrumentalize the potential of Brazil's defense
sector required a sort of re-intellectualization of strategy, planning, and force development. In
September 2007, Lula launched a working group to direct the drafting of a modernization plan
for the Armed Forces; the group was headed by the Defense Ministry and coordinated by thenMinister Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency Roberto Mangabeira
Unger.
Out of this initiative came the Strategic Plan of National Defense (Duarte Villa and Viana
2010), which sought: «I) to review defense strategies; II) to reactivate the domestic arms
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industry; III) to assure [sic] the autonomy of defense policy.» (p. 8) This broad review also
focused on rekindling: issues of national and territorial sovereignty and identity vis-a-vis the
Armed Forces [giving special attention to the Amazon sub-region], strategic concepts for peace
and war times, the technological and organizational upgrading of the military, issues regarding
military service and social-development tasks, and the directives that the Armed Forces should
operate on when called upon to perform as guarantors of internal public order, security, and law
enforcement.
Brazil’s re-insertion into the international community as an exemplary force to be
reckoned with, which has been a historical item on the country’s development wishlist since its
independence (Degaut 2016), was a notorious theme of the Lula administration. The novelty
seemed to be that defense policy would become a highly-visible part of the framework to pursue
this ambition; accordingly, an agenda was adopted to shape that policy rubric (Alves Soares
2012).
In 2005, the Ministry of Defense’s National Defense Policy document came out.
Interestingly, this early national security guidance product of the Lula administration accepts a
concept similar to that of the Venezuelan 1999 Constitution and 2002 National Security Organic
Law: the concept of integral defense and security; in other words, the emphasis of coresponsibility over national defense and security that exists between the sate and society. Hence,
in the very first paragraph, the document already mentions the involvement of the civilian world
in national training for all spheres of national power (Ministry of Defense 2005). And the
document highlights how «[I]t is imprudent to imagine that a country with the potentiality of
Brazil doesn't have disputes or antagonisms when aiming to reach its legitimate interests. One of
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the purposes of the National Defense Policy is to make all the segments of the Brazilian society
aware that the defense of the Nation is a duty of all Brazilians.» (p. 1)
Three years later, the National Strategy of Defense was approved and published by way
of Lula’s presidential Decree no. 6703, of December 18th, 2008. This document presented a much
more detailed argumentation of how the defense and security goals set forth by the Lula
administration stemmed from the Federal Constitution’s mandates, the previous defense policy
documents/whitepapers, and the national interests of Brazil – as defined by both its foreign
policy tradition32 and by its economic- and social-development imperatives (Alves Soares 2012;
Ministry of Defense 2008). Some common themes are revised in this document: reorganization
and composition of the Armed Forces, restructuring the domestic defense industry, promoting
the implementation of compulsory/mandatory military service, among others. Of note is the fact
that: «[a] key NDS [National Defense Strategy] tenet is that Brazil can only achieve national
independence and international prominence through mastery of sensitive technologies in the
strategic sectors of space, cybernetics, and nuclear affairs.» (Diehl and Fujii 2009, para. 2)
Then, in 2010, Supplementary Law 136 restructured the Ministry of Defense -created in
1999- under three scopes: the creation of a Joint Chief of Staff and Joint Staff, the broadening of
formal attributions of defense ministers33, and the broadening and upgrading of the civilian staff
of the Defense Ministry (Alves Soares 2012). Essentially, this legal instrument allowed the Lula
administration to cement and solidify the conquests attained with, and projected through, the
major defense policy documents of the preceding years. The still-young tool crafted a decade
32 Three essential principles stand out: non-intervention or non-belligerence, defense of peace, and peaceful
resolution of conflicts.
33 The 2008 National Strategy of Defense exhorted the government to secure the institutional function/role of this
office, as well as to ensure jointness among the three branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces [Army, Navy, Air
Force]: «The Minister of Defense will fully perform all the direction of the Armed Forces, those the
Constitution and the Laws do not explicitly assign to the President. The subordination of the Armed Forces to
the constitutional political power is a basic premise of the republican regime and a guarantee of the Nation’s
integrity.» (Ministry of Defense 2008, p. 12)
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earlier in order to begin implementing more serious civilian control over the military, the
Brazilian Ministry of Defense, had just come of age.

Change with Continuity
It is safe to say that it was particularly after 2007 that the major changes and reforms to
the Brazilian defense sector were made by the Lula administration – that is, only after Lula had
secured a second term in office. For instance, on 21 February, 2007, a newly-reelected President
da Silva changed the commanders of the three branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces
(Latinnews Daily 2007). This move was scarcely publicized and might have been motivated by
the upcoming need to secure the support of the high command towards the new transformations
in defense policy that were on their way that same year.
In an act of strategic wisdom, on April 12, 2010 the Brazilian government resumed the
Defense Cooperation Agreement [DCA] with the U.S. The official press release by the U.S.
Department of State, covering this event, concluded with:

The United States seeks partnership with the other nations in the Americas to
address the complex security challenges that all our countries face. The
strengthening of U.S.-Brazil defense cooperation at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels will enable our two countries, and our neighbors, to come closer to
achieving this goal.
Office of the Spokesman 2010, para. 5

Taking into account events like this one, some analysts claim that during the two recent
PT administrations in Brazil, «military cooperation with the U.S. continued, and actually
improved.» (Bitencourt 2018, p. 25)
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Generally speaking, one can agree with Olavo de Carvalho in his popular assessment that
“Lula” da Silva was a master player in the game of calculated perception and protagonism on the
world geopolitical chessboard. He was able to please the liberal, global-capitalist interest groups
while simultaneously managing to become a “rock star” figure for the socialist, international
Left: Lula eventually received equal praise at the World Economic Forum in Davos, and at the
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. It was this sort of scissors strategy what his administration,
with the key help of figures like then-Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, became famous for and
perhaps applied internally as well as externally.

Bottom Line
Narrowing down the scope and time frame of this case study to the years of the Lula
administration, made the workload for analysis manageable and reasonable. This applies to the
chapter on Venezuela, as well. However, it must be recognized that the openly-available
information, in the English language, regarding the case study in point is not as abundant as the
openly-available information, in Spanish, regarding the Venezuela case study. This difficulted
things for the author of this thesis paper, for sure. Nonetheless, it is also likely that Lula did not
attempt a radical, total transformation of the Brazilian armed forces. However assertive his
agenda for «broadening Brazilian “South-South foreign policy”» (Bitencourt 2018, p. 25) may
have been, and however much that political-ideological leaning may have unsettled policy- and
decision-makers in Washington, D.C., the evidence suggests that Lula sought to appease -for
lack of a better term- the Brazilian defense establishment. He strove to accomplish that with
larger modernization efforts (both intellectual and material), bilateral cooperation with NATO
allies, and a kind of “military rapprochement” with the United States.
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Lula played the card of projecting the image of a “Brazilian giant” as a friendly regional
hegemon: a kind of would-be mature, older-brother figure to other Latin American states.
Defense and security affairs were a conduit for Lula’s administration to play this card, at least
according to many experts. At the same time, and knowing very well the historical propensity of
the Brazilian armed forces to intervene in the country’s major political decisions, Lula’s team
sought to refocus the military’s energy to the outside world and the most pressing regional
issues, without endangering the SPF’s interests. This came about while the administration was
slowly engineering ways to empower the Ministry of Defense, as a hub to secure and ensure the
executive’s political control over the Brazilian Armed forces. A big part of this change was
achieved under the rubrics of modernization and professionalization.
The Lula administration was thus very careful, apparently, not to rock the Brazilian
defense boat too much, and consequently played a very delicate game of change and continuity
with stellar moments of satisfaction generated for the defense establishment, in order to please
the traditional military organization. However, lest we forget that Lula is a founding member and
figurehead of the São Paulo Forum, his party -the Workers’ Party- the founding host of the
Forum, and his city and state -São Paulo- the proud initial hub and operations base for the SPF’s
secretariat. Sure, there was a smart and timely recognition, from the PT’s leadership, that the
Brazilian defense and security sectors’ “objective and subjective conditions” did not warrant a
profound transformation of the armed forces and the associated power factors and centers. In
other words, the military and their world were not ripe for radical change. But, even if
unsuccessful and even if the later PT administration of Dilma Roussef couldn’t finish the job,
Lula’s people did set the stage and the record straight for: getting the military mostly out of the
War on Drugs and the War on Terror (e.g. largely ignoring threats like FARC, ELN, etc.), for
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establishing the architecture of a future military integration of Latin America and the Caribbean,
and for plausibly paving the way towards political indoctrination of the defense and security
forces by first securing their complete subordination to the political -away from the purely
bureaucratic- leadership in the government.
Perhaps the PT didn’t necessarily lack the skills, the concentration of power, or the
wisdom to carry out the SPF’s armed forces agenda: it appears rather that time wasn’t on their
side. If this is true, then a possible re-election of Lula to the presidency of the Federative
Republic of Brazil could bring about a more assertive/aggressive program of radical
transformation to the entire national security field in the country, along the lines of the SPF’s
agenda, with special emphasis placed on the armed forces and the rest of the defense agencies
and stakeholders, both public and private.
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CHAPTER 4: KEY FINDINGS AND WHY THEY MATTER

Let us now turn to separately analyzing the correspondence -or lack thereof- between
each case study’s results and the policy-guidance synthesis performed in the second chapter of
this work. In other words, the following is a look at the correspondence -or lack thereofbetween: the defense policy changes of the Chávez administration [Venezuela: 1999-2012] and
the SPF armed forces agenda; and the defense policy changes of the Lula administration [Brazil:
2003-2010] and the SPF armed forces agenda.

Chávez-Era Venezuela
The implementation of the civil-military union/alliance doctrine corresponds with the
SPF’s agenda. The radical transformation of the legal and judicial framework that sustains the
armed forces’ institutional role within the nation-state, in order to make way for concepts such as
integral defense, regional military integration, the “horizontalization” of the chain of command,
etc., corresponds with the SPF’s agenda. On the other hand, the continuous expansion of the
military’s roles & missions into the realm and functions of internal security, public order, and
law enforcement, well beyond the scope of the National Guard’s traditional roles & missions,
contradicts the SPF’s agenda.
The normalization of a deliberative (politically active) military establishment corresponds
with the SPF’s agenda. The sympathetic, apologetic, and even protective approach towards the
handling of a multiplicity of violent extremist organizations and other ideologically-motivated,
violent non-state actors corresponds with the SPF’s agenda. Severing all ties with the U.S.
defense sector and cutting most military relations with NATO members corresponds with the
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SPF’s agenda. Creating the Reserves and then the Militia as a separate branch, loyal exclusively
to the party leadership, corresponds with the SPF’s agenda.
Partnering with major U.S. adversaries, both regional and extra-hemispheric, corresponds
with the SPF’s agenda and the touted quest for a multipolar world. The subordination of the
armed forces to the Revolution, and its defense as top priority, corresponds with the SPF’s
agenda.
The adoption of an anti-imperialistic, asymmetric/resistance warfare doctrine, concept,
and military thought, by the armed forces, corresponds with the SPF’s agenda. Fomenting the
military establishment to fill in or occupy large portions of the country’s government/public
sector does not correspond with the SPF’s agenda.
Establishing the CEO as a way of consolidating the Presidency’s grip over the armed
forces’ chain of command corresponds with the SPF’s agenda, in the sense that is secures
political control over the military – strategically and operationally. The creation of new ranks
within the military hierarchy, to emulate friendly militaries from the LAC region, corresponds
with the SPF’s agenda as a stepping stone towards achieving a future military integration of the
regional bloc.

Lula-Era Brazil
Securing a sharper separation between the defense sector’s activities and the security
services’ functions corresponds with the SPF’s agenda. An apologetic and sympathetic approach
towards handling terrorist, narco-terrorist, and/or insurgent organizations, and other violent nonstate actors and extremists, on the grounds of a supposed need to re-assess the root causes of
violent conflicts in the LAC region, corresponds with the SPF’s agenda.
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The enthusiastic push for the establishment of the CODESUR as a tool for regional,
autonomous military integration and as a stepping stone towards the strengthening of UNASUR,
corresponds with the SPF’s agenda.
The technological modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces does not correspond with
the SPF’s agenda. What’s more, the fact that this modernization effort -along with its intended
beneficial repercussions upon the domestic Brazilian defense industry- was achieved through the
significant involvement and cooperation of a NATO ally, contradicts the SPF’s agenda.
Brazil’s starring role in regional peacekeeping efforts, concocted by way of a unilateral
decision-making process, does not correspond with the SPF’s agenda.
Expanding and consolidating the institutional stature of the Ministry of Defense, beyond
purely administrative functions, corresponds with the SPF’s agenda inasmuch as this measure
aggregates power on the most common instrument of civilian/political control of the military –
curtailing its autonomy and own sense of “caste”.
Streamlining a more transparent and systematic strategic-guidance development process
for the defense sector, tying its upgrade to the country’s own version of a Manifest Destiny and
the so-called Brazilian exceptionalism, does not correspond with the SPF’s agenda. On the other
hand, opening the intellectual and legal gates up for a deeper adoption of the concepts of the
integral defense doctrine, in the future, corresponds with the SPF’s agenda.
Pursuing the normalization of a climate in which revolutionary changes to defense policy
are the expectation within and outside the defense sector, corresponds with the SPF’s agenda.
Nonetheless, maintaining and improving defense cooperation -of any kind- with the United
States contradicts the SPF’s agenda.
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Lessons Learned and their Significance
Why should these findings matter to the U.S. interagency, in consideration of American
national interests? The answer is multi-pronged:
There is now less doubt about the weight of São Paulo Forum prescriptions over the
governmental behavior of its member parties and figureheads, especially over those who find
themselves in a position comfortable enough to pursue a more extreme/revolutionary agenda in
their respective countries. Granted, the SPF’s national security agenda is complex and sometimes
covered in ambiguity or abstract generalization. It is most likely meant to be a flexible paradigm
for members, rather than a detailed, specific recipe to follow. Nonetheless, the SPF is interested
chiefly in the four “bottom-line” points described at the end of chapter 1 of this work. Given the
intellectual heritage at the heart of the SPF’s political-ideological record, it is not unreasonable to
think of the Forum’s strategy as being one of attrition: a sort of “long march through the regional
institutions”. Despite some of the media commentary from the last couple of years, the SPF’s
history reveals patience: a preference for a Fabian-socialist-styled gradual, progressive, and
corrosive approach to radical change, seeking limited, cumulative effects rather than quick blows
against the structures and practices they aim to transform or eliminate. The example of Brazil is
probably a case in point. In 2003, during Lula’s first year in office, a joint communique from
Lula’s party, the PT, and the SPF was emitted in support of the FARC, their struggle, and the
multilateral effort that was then building up to scratch the FARC’s name from the list of
international terrorist organizations (Bula-Escobar 2016). That same year, such an attitude vis-avis the handling of the Colombian conflict would become the crux of the Brazilian Executive’s
official policy stance on the matter. Therefore, a review of the Lula administration’s defense
policy innovations may not reveal total obedience to the SPF agenda, in absolute terms. In
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relative terms, however, the qualitative advantage of having a regional leader such as the
Brazilian government supporting the Forum’s imperatives towards Colombia, has a massive
beneficial effect for the SPF, even if it is only on that pressure point.
That being said, it may be easy to get carried away into thinking that both of the case
studies covered by this paper represent the most striking/extreme cases of SPF national defense
& security policy influence in the LAC. They’re not – insofar as Brazil cannot be considered an
extreme case. Nicaragua is perhaps another obviously striking case, akin to Venezuela. In Brazil,
the PT administration/government was ousted and a very different political color rules the
Executive now. This means not only that the military and the rest of the national defense/security
establishment were not turned into an arm of the ideological project analyzed in the Introduction.
It also means that, in the country where the Forum formally began and had one of its founding
organizations and main sponsors become the ruling party for over 13 years, with one of its top
founding leaders as head of state, the SPF could not effectively take over the entirety of the
institutions necessary to stay in power.
The findings in this and previous chapters confirm a fascinating trait of international
security and the dynamics both within and between nation-states: concrete -objective and
subjective- conditions matter. Countries and nations and governments are not blank sheets of
paper whose content unfolds in a geographical and historical vacuum. They cannot be
transformed at will in only a few years. Political, economic, socio-cultural, technological,
intellectual, ethical, ethnological, and other factors both enable and constrict change or
continuity, and usually in very particular combinations thereof. In the reading of this work, a
nation’s strategic culture and, as one of its subsets, military culture become potent variables for
understanding the directions taken by leaders and concrete government bureaucracies in the
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realm of defense policy, and the whys and why-nots of change and continuity. Venezuela’s was
an exhausted, collapsing socio-political structure when Chávez assumed the Presidency in 1999.
On so many levels, its societal institutions had be corroded and eroded to the point of showing
little resistance to the revolutionary project. Political, economic, military, and cultural elite
circles were pretty much impotent -and even sympathetic- when it came to facing the Bolivarian
socialist strategy and tactics, despite some brief moments of intense challenge against the radical
process taking place in the country. In Brazil, things were different. Even though the SPF was
founded in Brazil by the very same PT, under the auspices of Lula, its conquest of Brazilian
defense policy orientations was nowhere near as complete as it turned out in Venezuela, where
Chávez’s ruling party is by no means a founder, or even senior member, of the original alliance.
Brazil had just recently (1985) transitioned out of a cycle of military dictatorships, its powerful
foreign-policy bureaucracy was still strong and accustomed to a high degree of autonomy vis-avis the political flux of administrations and electoral contests, and its elites were likely still
cohesive and able to wield a significant amount of hegemony over the Brazilian state’s centers of
power. The corollary from this being, in short, that politically-successful SPF members have to
adapt to their own realities’ objective and subjective conditions, showing flexibility and the will
to apply Lenin’s two steps forward, one step backwards maxim to their behavior in government
and their public policy program. It is thus important that U.S. policy towards the Hemisphere be
crafted only upon careful evaluation of the differing conditions and factors that shape the
acceptance of, or resistance to, certain ruling-party programs and agendas. In other words, the
U.S. antidote to the SPF agenda has to be as flexible and tailor-made as the Forum’s own
performance seems to be, regarding each and every country in the LAC region.
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The SPF does not operate in a geopolitical vacuum: the LAC region is not a standardized,
one-size-fits all universe that lends itself to reductionist assessments of the strategic
environment. Control over the Venezuelan state and its riches had been a decades-long ambition
of the Castro regime in Cuba, therefore, its penetration of the Venezuelan government/state was
already deep, by the time that Chávez first ran for office. In Brazil, the Castro-communist
influence of Cuba and its regional allies and proxies seems to have been a lot less significant, at
least within the governmental civilian and military spheres, when Lula won the presidential
elections in 2002. Both countries had been largely successful at quelling the Left-wing guerrilla
insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s, nevertheless, the autonomic, far-less-dependent nature of
the Brazilian state and its sources of wealth may have done a huge difference throughout its
contemporary history vis-a-vis Venezuela’s situation and ability to shield itself from extremist
influence. Again, the U.S. must take into account all of these specific internal, bilateral, and
multilateral geopolitical/geostrategic relations and interactions across each one of the countries
that make up the LAC region, paying special attention to the weight of history in the crafting of
policy responses to the subcontinent’s ills.
The expansion of the SPF’s country-by-country power and influence means the
contraction of case-specific maneuver space for the U.S. government: it’s a zero-sum game.
Through Chávez’s MVR/PSUV, for example, the SPF was able to completely shut the U.S. out
of the defense equation for Venezuela – a process accomplished in 6 years. For Brazil, Lula’s PT
did not manage to block out the U.S. defense-sector presence and had, in fact, allowed for the
bilateral defense relationship to rejuvenate, by the end of Lula’s 8-year tenure. This means that
the SPF had not gained the total net amount of power and influence that it had probably hoped to
gain by way of the PT holding the highest office in the land. These statements are probably true
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even well beyond the fields of the national security and defense sectors and point to the living,
non-static, shifting nature of the opportunities and challenges that the U.S. defense- and foreignpolicy organs must be able to play with in order to expand the geopolitical maneuver space. They
must be able to translate such expansions into defeats for the Forum’s network, perhaps even
while a large amount of its members is still in power.
The price of neglect and ignorance towards the Western Hemisphere is the invitation for
strategic competition with adversaries, at the U.S.’ nearest front line: its own neighborhood. This
lesson is likely a logical consequence or corollary of the previous item on this list, and lends
credence to some portions of the Realpolitik or realist perspective in International Relations
Theory34. In the presence of a global strategic contest, «all the world’s a stage», so to speak, and
adversarial powers will always seek to gain advantage, in both space and time, to advance their
interests. Penetrating, dominating, and then leveraging alliances and other power structures in the
United States’ own continental neighborhood is a sound geostrategic goal, from the viewpoint of
capable adversaries such as Russia, the PRC, Iran, and even North Korea. However puzzling,
amorphous, contradictory, or incoherent the ideological/intellectual compromises of antiWestern partnerships across the LAC region appear to some analysts (de Arístegui 2008), the
truth is that a common enemy is a powerful unification factor. The SPF is, itself, proof of that. Its
networked entities also apply such a logic and the appreciation of common hatreds, desires, and
appetites when it comes to engaging and bonding with extra-regional: parties, non-state actors,
non-governmental organizations, governments, intellectual circles, other multilateral fora, etc.
U.S. national security and defense decision makers have been warned long enough (Faller 2021)
against Latin America & the Caribbean falling to the bottom of the priorities list, in terms of U.S.
34 Such as the adaptation of Elitist Theory to the field of international relations: whereby the rise in influence and
projection of a rising power is always the function of a simultaneous decline in influence and projection of a
waning power. There is also the related idea that the global geopolitical contest space abhors a power vacuum,
and thus the absence of leadership is almost always filled by a competing symmetric or asymmetric force.
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engagement and focus. And the cost of such a derelict attitude towards the Western Hemisphere
might be more than that of an imperfect preparation for conventional, high-end war in either the
European or the Indo-Pacific theaters of operations.
It seems important to clarify that the São Paulo Forum is not a multilateral organization.
It isn’t – first and foremost for two obvious reasons: it is not integrated by states/governments,
and it is not an organization (in the sense that its organs/parts perform the roles of facilitators in a
relatively-loose network, which serves as a communicating vessel between state and non-state,
national and transnational, legal and illegal, political and para-political, formal and informal
entities and power players and brokers and factors). The SPF exists beyond -sometimes behindthe functions of states/governments, even though it benefits from concrete governments and
exists partly because it has its hands within certain governments (Hernández 2016). The
Communist Party of Cuba is perhaps the only member which can be considered a “state actor”
that enjoys an outsized role to play in the Forum, adding to the fact that such an entity has most
likely been steering the SPF’s development/activities since the network was conceived. But the
fact that Brazil’s PT and Cuba’s PCC precede the Forum chronologically, ideologically, and
strategically is not really an argument to suggest that the SPF is the instrument of particular
Latin-American & Caribbean states/governments and their grand strategies / foreign policies. If
anything can be hypothesized that far up the level of abstraction/analysis, it would be instead that
certain governments throughout the LAC region have become, at certain points in time and to
varying degrees, instruments of the Forum’s grand strategy; whereas a smaller number of
states/governments are now so enmeshed with the network’s leadership (or central nodes) that it
becomes rather difficult to separate the state actor’s behavior from the goals of the transnational
alliance. The fact that the SPF can remain both coherent and cohesive, in terms of ideology and
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objectives, while at the same time appearing so diverse and overcrowded, in terms of its member
list and the nature of the members’ specific platforms, says more about the historically
overriding goals, imperatives, and necessities of the revolutionary Left’s continental strategy
than about the hypothetical presence of a group of official, orchestrating state hands from
regimes like those in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The foreign policy apparatus of the United States government, particularly the national
security communities (intelligence, defense, law enforcement, strategic systems, etc.), typically
generate periodic documents to guide policy and strategy at the federal level. In these documents
and summaries, at least in the ones unclassified, the different agencies, organs, and bodies that
carry out the functions and tasks of national security divide world security threats into two large
camps, however problematic the two are conceptually: state actors and non-state actors.
The São Paulo Forum, by virtue of its power to steer the national defense and security
policy programs of its members, should be regarded as a threat to international and regional
security. The reason for that categorization is that once a member reaches high office they will
try to implement the agenda, with varying degrees of success; that is: they will try to make some
or most changes necessary to radically transform the defense-and-security sectors and forces of
their respective countries and governments, in ways that partially or completely antagonize with
stated U.S. goals and objectives in the Western Hemisphere (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016).
Chances are that, at a minimum, these SPF members will be able to generate some negative
effect with their policies once they’re installed in office; an effect that, if aggregated to other
such effects throughout the LAC region, generated by similar actors, predictably and collectively
can have a lasting detrimental impact on U.S. strategy and efforts to promote stability, peace, and
prosperity.
Even if only qualitatively important, one Venezuela-style debacle (Reuters Staff 2012),
one Bolivarian Revolution is one too many in the LAC region. The disruptive, destabilizing, and
destructive potential stemming from such a security-threat exporter and hub can multiply and
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grow exponentially, if never checked. The radical effects of such a transformation can be most
clearly glanced at with other examples such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and even the powerful non-state
actors associated with the Colombian conflict. The damaging effects brought upon the Western
Hemisphere by these hubs, in terms of sharp power, is also subjecting many nations and
governments to unprecedented levels of institutional corruption, coercion, and corrosion. This
onslaught of so-called strategic corruption not only erodes these states’ ability to then respond to
major security threats of any kind and contribute their part to the Good Neighbor Policy, but it
also cements the vulnerabilities -new or old- that are then exploited by malign non-hemispheric
state and/or non-state actors in order to advance their strategies. Overall, the risk to regional
security is increased many times over whenever there is another SPF revolution on the horizon –
if we consider that Risk = Vulnerability x Threat.
But under what “camp” should the SPF be labeled? Is it a non-state actor, really? Given
the fact that it operates mainly to conquer state power and that it strengthens itself by way of its
members’ control of national or sub-national governments, can it be properly considered a
classic non-state entity? And given the fact that it is truly international -and even transnationalin its dealings and in the networked nature of its individual member organizations and persons, is
it merely the equivalent to a government in disguise? Or is it actually a formidable supranational
entity/organism? Any answer to these questions would be, at this point, merely speculative, as it
would greatly surpass the explanatory potency, not to mention the research goals and objectives,
of this study. The few experts out there that can comment long enough on the nature of the
Forum do not agree on a defining terminology. Hence, transplanted or adopted terms-of-art from
the U.S. Department of Defense, such as transnational threat network (TTN) or superempowered TTN, never seem to fit the known description, however tempting it may be to use
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such terms. In this regard, comprehensive and exhaustive multidisciplinary research is required
to fully identify the SPF’s underlying characteristics, in order to effectively tackle it as a threat to
international security. The United States’ and other regional partners’ national security
communities carry the burden of doing away with inadequate notions copied from the heyday of
the Communist International or the OSPAAAL, and consequently need to look at the
phenomenon from all angles and consider all possibilities without preconceived labels.
In this same vein, what follows in a list of broad conclusions directly extracted from the
analysis performed at the intersection between this study’s dependent and independent variables.
The tail end of this thesis paper consists of two additional lists, similar to the general conclusions
one: a list of recommendations for public policy, from the perspective of the United States
federal government interagency, with a focus on the major defense-sector stakeholders in charge
of these matters; and a list of recommendations for future academic and scholarly research, both
following in the footsteps of this study or otherwise, within this field of work or parallel to it,
with the hope of encouraging many disciplines to chime in with their own corpus of knowledge
and contribute to the deeper understanding of this fascinating, albeit menacing, entity and the
consequences of its activity.

General Conclusions
The São Paulo Forum’s defense and security agenda has influence over its members’
administrations regarding their countries’ defense sector policies, particularly their military
policies. Nevertheless, this assertion carries within it multiple nuances. Influence does not -and
cannot- amount to dictate, given the complex nature and structure of even the weakest and
smallest modern republican governments. Public policy-making does not always translate well
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into decision-making, let alone government action: a political and governmental system replete
with internal friction, segmentation, and compartmentalization can easily be a formidable
obstacle to the practical implementation of concepts, doctrines, or directives that maybe even
look great on paper. This conclusion’s assertion has to do more with the political actors’ attitudes
and volition, as it is the function of the actors’ loyalty to a preexisting political-ideological power
structure. It has to do less with the concrete end-result of the said actors’ performances in
governmental/bureaucratic positions of authority, as such performances are both limited and
enabled by the actors’ own traits and by the “objective and subjective conditions” under which
these actors’ performances take place. The aforementioned nuances might help this conclusion’s
assertion hold true in the face of discrepancies, originated from further scrutiny on the matter of
the SPF’s influence over the countries under its members’ control; for instance: is the assertion
also true for other countries whose leaders are members of the SPF, but have not implemented
the SPF’s agenda and policy prescriptions? Or, further still: although Chávez’s Venezuela and
Lula’s Brazil can be considered SPF successes, why have other governments led by SPF
members not been so successful?
The level of influence exerted by the São Paulo Forum’s agenda over the defense policy
initiatives of the Chávez administration (1999-2012), in Venezuela, was very high.
The level of influence exerted by the São Paulo Forum’s agenda over the defense policy
initiatives of the Lula administration (2003-2010), in Brazil, was moderate or partial.
The number one strategic imperative of the São Paulo Forum is the destabilization of the
Latin America & Caribbean region, with the immediate goal of facilitating the crises and
processes that can later be exploited to consolidate more power for its member organizations and
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leaders, in order to redirect such power towards the ultimate goal of a complete regional
integration under a single ideology.
National strategic culture and, in particular, military culture can represent a significant
obstacle for the successful implementation of the São Paulo Forum’s armed forces agenda. In
Venezuela, Chávez had to cater to the historical military temptation of seeking to expand its roles
& missions into the realm of internal security, public order, and law enforcement. In Brazil, Lula
had to cater to the traditional ambition of the Brazilian foreign-policy apparatus regarding the
elevation of Brazil as regional leader and respectable world player with good relations with the
West; he also felt the need to please the Brazilian military establishment by feeding its appetite
for technological and operational upgrades, and by turning that appetite outwards – risking a
degree of unilateralism.
The São Paulo Forum’s policy agenda has not been a static product, neither in time nor
space. The Forum recognizes the tactical imperatives of flexibility, adaptability, and crisis
leveraging. These and other good practices in formulating and designing policy prescriptions and
recommendations have allowed the Forum to incorporate new items -and expand old ones- to the
agenda, adapt some items in view of a particular crisis or priority arising in one or more
countries in the region, adjust the language and rhetoric pertaining to some items so as to
accommodate the current global situation or accepted discourse, etc. The classic advice from
revolutionary Marxist thinkers to always evaluate objective and subjective conditions in order to
preserve the marriage between theory and praxis, so as to remain at the forefront of effective
revolutionary strategy, is alive and well with the São Paulo Forum.
The complete fulfillment of the Forum’s defense and security agenda would spell serious
trouble for the objectives and means of USSOUTHCOM in the LAC region. The PRC, Russia,
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Iran, North Korea, and international terrorist organizations, would each benefit from the
lawlessness, ungoverned territories, illicit economies, ability to claim natural resources, state
weakness/balkanization, corruption, and anti-U.S. indoctrination that would result in such a
scenario. Each actor would benefit in their own way, of course, depending on their global
strategies and characteristic approach/outlook – and that could even pave the way for a
hypothetical catastrophic scenario of “turf war” competition between the adversaries, in this
Hemisphere.
The São Paulo Forum’s defense and security agenda’s four non-negotiable / invariable
points, during the period analyzed for this study (1990-2013), together amount to a defensesector picture that is very similar to that painted by the Cuban military doctrine and the concepts
that the Cuban FAR is most comfortable with. Complete “decolonization” of the region, severing
all defense and security ties with the U.S., de-securitization and de-militarization of regional
conflicts and conflict actors’ activities, and the adoption of an asymmetric/resistance warfare
framework for the armed forces and society writ large, is exactly what the anti-imperialistic
posture of the Cuban FAR handles best. This is, by the way, contrary to what the bulk of the
regional armed forces have traditionally gravitated towards.
The ultimate success of the São Paulo Forum’s strategy still rests on the ability to utilize
the nation-state in favor of the Revolution. Using the resources, talents, bureaucracies, relative
international stature, and diplomatic and defense power projections of each country in which
they grab on to government control, is still the main means to the stated end voiced by the
Forum. This implies that the São Paulo Forum does not exist but within a matrix in which its
network is both enabled and constrained by concrete political, economic, legal, cultural,
strategic, historical, and other realities that are not always under its exclusive sphere or radius of
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influence. Some concrete realities might also even escape the Forum’s ability to grasp, process,
and analyze different scenarios for operation.
If the Venezuelan defense and security revolution, undertaken by Chávez’s project, were
to replicate many times elsewhere in Latin America & the Caribbean, and affect a majority of the
countries in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, the Department of Defense and the
Department of State would have an almost impossible task of trying to restore some level of
trust, cooperation, burden-sharing, or even governability and governance with and within most
countries in the region. In such a scenario, the prospects for stability, peace, and prosperity
throughout the Western Hemisphere would be slim-to-none. If the Brazilian case under Lula
were to replicate thus, other concerns regarding strategic stability and conventional arms races
would arise, and yet even more concerns would surface regarding the approach toward regional
conflicts and security vulnerabilities. However, facing such a regional scenario (the latter
scenario) would be easier for the U.S. to handle. This is true given the avenues for
communication and close cooperation that would remain open with individual countries’ defense
and security sectors, and also given the superior defense and diplomatic stature that the U.S.
enjoys as “natural”, historical arbiter of disputes and schisms in the region, both bilaterally and
multilaterally.

Recommendations for Policy
The first step to solving a problem is openly recognizing the problem. The national
security establishment of the United States of America has yet to formally recognize the threat
potential of a São Paulo Forum operating as a rogue transnational power network. Defense
policy making also does not take place in a vacuum. It is not a linear process either. It is a multi-

77

dimensional, multi-disciplinary endeavor best understood as a complex negotiation between
bureaucracies, external power brokers, and decision makers, and as a confluence of a myriad
societal factors which condition the process. Influencing those who are the target of influence by
the São Paulo Forum’s and other malign agendas, across the LAC region, is a sound approach by
the organs of U.S. foreign affairs.
The U.S. government must re-engage with the LAC region on a higher level of priority.
This can be justified as an Americanist geostrategic doctrine that does not lessen commitments
and deterrence objectives in other critical hot spots across the globe, but rather couples them with
a recognition of the obvious need to secure the Western Hemisphere and, especially, the southern
approaches to the United States, as a minimum requirement for successful strategic competition
with major adversaries. There is nothing wrong with defending the neighborhood first. The U.S.
national security community has to let go of all the self-imposed prejudices and perceived fears
regarding benign U.S. intervention in Latin America & the Caribbean.
Military-to-military exchanges are perhaps nowhere near as crucial as they are with
sympathetic countries in the LAC region. Restoring the perception of the U.S. as partner of
choice, exceeding any reasonable benefits offered by the PRC or the Russians, can go a long way
in creating a ripple effect on doubtful defense establishments who can still be persuaded to go
American.
The end of the Venezuelan tragedy will most likely require the total defeat of the
Marxist-Chavista force that occupies its government, at all levels of society. At this point, there
is no easy or quick way out, but one has to start by at least identifying the enemy correctly. The
Cuban Communist Party is a senior, determinant entity in the São Paulo Forum and, as such, can
become the target of improved containment and disruption efforts. Conversely, the Brazilian case
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can serve as an example of how sustained, robust defense cooperation can keep channels open
for influence and understanding in the highest positions of power. The friendly encouragement of
Brazil as a civilized regional leader can secure the sympathetic stance of its foreign policy
leadership and bureaucracy, which can, in turn, guarantee a long-term priceless ally in the South,
vis-a-vis the challenges to come. The same thing goes for Colombia. Interestingly, it is with
these two nations that the U.S. will need to shoulder the most, in order to find realistic
alternatives to be able to tackle the Venezuelan conundrum.
U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities need to be jointly employed in order to map out
and analyze the São Paulo Forum’s entire network (relations, sub-networks, centers of gravity,
critical nodes, periphery, and global connections), especially by spotting the links with
transnational organized crime and extremism. The network’s real and perceived weaknesses,
vulnerabilities, threats, and risks must be properly identified in order to figure out better ways to
contain, disrupt, degrade, and defeat its operations and normal performance.
The United States government has superb public diplomacy and communications
capabilities worldwide. Capacity should be expanded and geared towards better information
warfare campaigns against the destabilizing effects of the Forum’s existence. The SPF has relied
for decades on not transcending very opaque, if any, media coverage, and it has succeeded in
expanding and accumulating power under a shroud of denial. It is time to end that tactical
advantage by resorting to the serious exposure of SPF goals and the disclosure of uncomfortable
connections.
How has the Forum grown stronger and been able to stay resilient through so many
political defeats and setbacks in recent years? Is there a steady stream of income sources for its
regular operation? Is that stream perhaps tied to its more obscure relations with the regional
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criminal underworld? Only good intelligence collection and sharing can answer these questions
in a professional way. But with USSOUTHCOM, and the interagency which aids its activities,
facing year after year of underfunded budgets, limited asset availability, and shortage of
resources to spend on even the most essential of its missions (like interdiction, all-source
intelligence gathering, and maritime patrol), it is very difficult to get the structure to work – a
structure that’s already available and in place. Better resource allocation for these forces and
agencies has to be guaranteed in this area of operations. The bare minimum is not enough.
The LAC region’s private business sector has much to lose if the SPF’s endgame
materializes, given the extreme ideological leaning of the club. The United States public and
private sectors have many shared interests throughout the Western Hemisphere, and the LAC
region represents an almost limitless potential opportunity zone for many global markets. The
U.S. government has the tools to renew efforts for international public-private partnerships that
generate common solutions, as well as enduring platforms, to expose the Forum and defeat its
agenda on the battlefield of ideas (hearts and minds).
Finally, a coalition of friendly regional neighbors can be formed and energized by a U.S.
diplomatic and multilateral security initiative to openly oppose and condemn what is perhaps the
biggest, most problematic generator of asymmetric warfare instability within the LAC region:
the SPF.

Recommendations for Further Research
Perform an open-source network analysis of the entire São Paulo Forum. Expand the
amount of similar case-study analyses to other countries under SPF-member rule. Expand the
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scope of correspondence analyses, performed with each case study, to the wider realms of
foreign policy and security.
Upon deeper case-study availability, perform comparative analyses between countries
and administrations, in order to systematically spot patterns and common rubrics that make cases
more or less distinct. Perform both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of all the SPFmember administrations’ defense and security policy initiatives, in order to identify robust
commonalities in a comprehensive manner.
Perform a fully updated synthesis of the SPF’s defense and national security policy
agenda, compiling more detailed information from the Working Group and the theme groups at
each one of the recent gatherings – including all the available documentation emitted by the
Forum to date. Perform a comprehensive survey on irregular, asymmetric warfare theory and
practice, as connected to the most notorious leaders within the SPF and their respective
strategists, ideologues, geopolitical advisers, etc. This can begin by studying the case of Hugo
Chávez and his ideologues and strategy “gurus”.
Taking into account the absolute and relative importance of the SPF to the LAC region’s
new security reality, continue expanding and comparing research findings in the tradition and
paradigm of Dr. Max G. Manwaring. Special attention should be given to his understanding and
tracing of the origins of the project for a fourth-generation warfare super insurgency in the
region, as compared to other similar approaches in other parts of the world.
In the same vein, a thorough documentary and theoretical study of the formation and
evolution of the Cuban FAR should be carried out, in order to better grasp the doctrinal and
conceptual direction in which regimes like the one in Venezuela or Nicaragua are taking their
own defense and security sectors. Perform a region-wide study compiling all of the episodes and
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actions of internal resistance against the imposition of the São Paulo Forum’s defense and
security policy agenda. This will allow the researchers to identify differences and commonalities,
as well as useful patterns that can be leveraged by the U.S. to promote positive change within the
countries under the rule of an SPF member.
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